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ABSTRACT

Lauro, Daniel J. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University,
2018. The Battle of Malaya: The Japanese Invasion of Malaya as a Case Study for the
Re-Evaluation of Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence Effectiveness During World War
II.

The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II
is based almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The view presented is one
of complete incompetence by the West. Little attention has been paid to any successes the
Japanese intelligence organizations achieved. In fact, the majority of Anglo-American
historians have instead focused on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the
cause of their early failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence
efforts. The majority of the research does not take into account the extensive preparations
and training the Japanese intelligence organizations and military undertook in the lead up
to World War II. This information calls into question the assertion that Allied failures
were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes.
This study focuses on the Japanese intelligence efforts from 1930 to 1942. It will
analyze the events leading up to and the Invasion of Malaya. This was a pivotal event at
the opening of World War II, and was a decisive Japanese victory. Previously, the
success of Japanese forces during this, and other, event has been credited to failures in
Allied intelligence and preparedness. Western sources at large have claimed that Japanese
intelligence as a whole was faulty. This project will argue that in fact Japanese
iii

intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed greatly to Japanese successes. It
was as a result of severe organizational deficiencies and failures that appeared in the
latter half of the war that Japan eventually would fall behind in the intelligence war.
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Prologue
December 5th 1941, the Japanese First Air Fleet, designated Kido Butai or Mobile
Unit/Force, refueled for the final time on their approach to Pearl Harbor. December 6th
brought with it more, last minute, intelligence. Japanese submarines reported that the
American fleet was not using its alternate anchorage. In the evening, the command staff
had a final meeting during which they reviewed the operational plan one final time and
assessed the latest intelligence reports to have been received. The last of the reports from
their spy in Pearl Harbor arrived that night. The information that the operative sent was
posted on the ready room boards for all the pilots to see in the morning. At noon of that
same day, the Kido Butai had already adjusted its course due South and increased to full
speed. Grand crews had already lined the aircraft up on the decks and readied them for
combat while mechanics performed final inspections. By 6:15 a.m. approximately one
hundred and eighty Japanese fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes had formed up. By
7:00 a.m., using a radio direction finder tuned to a Honolulu station for guidance,
Commander Fuchida Mitsuo (1902-1976) estimated his attacking aircraft were an hour
out from their target.
At 7:49 a.m. Admiral Nagumo Chuichi (1887-1944) received the infamous
“TORA…TORA…TORA” radio message signaling that the attack on Pearl Harbor had
commenced. Admiral Yamamoto also received that message, due to favorable
atmospheric conditions, on his flagship near Hashirajima in Japanese imperial waters.
1

The first bombs began to fall on the US fleet at 7:55 a.m. The first torpedo, loosed
by Lt. Goto Inichi, struck the USS Oklahoma shortly after the first bombs were released.
Chaos reigned as the unprepared American seamen attempted to discern at first whether it
was an attack or insubordinate pilots barn storming the ships. Once the explosions began
American servicemen struggled to get their ships under way, attend to damage control,
and mount a defense. They categorically failed in all their efforts. The lone exception was
the USS Nevada. The Nevada was the only battleship to get underway. The ship and its
crew made a desperate dash for the open ocean but after taking several bomb hits and a
torpedo strike they were forced to beach to prevent blocking the harbor entrance.
Approximately one hour behind the first wave was the Japanese attack’s second wave.
Arriving from several directions at once, they attacked Ford Island, Hickam Field and
other vital aircraft facilities. The attack was over ninety minutes after the first bombs
dropped. Pearl Harbor was devastated. The United States Pacific Fleet lie shattered on the
harbor bottom. In the first fifteen minutes of the attack, the battleships USS Arizona and
Oklahoma had been sunk while the USS California and West Virginia had been severely
crippled. Five total battleships were sunk outright. The remaining battleships all received
substantial damage and it would be three months before the least damaged of them
returned to service. The Japanese had seemingly scored a decisive and demoralizing
victory against the Americans.1
In early 1941 top Japanese military commanders believed for a myriad of reasons
that war with the United States was inevitable. As early as the 1920s America and Britain
had been aware of the potential as Japan increased its imperial presence in the Pacific
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John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese
Navy in World War II, (New York: Random House, 1995), 184-189.
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region. Tensions between East and West escalated after Japan’s 1931 invasion of
Manchuria. Japan spent much of the 1930s after the invasion attempting to isolate China
from any Western help. Japan also began a more earnest attempt at becoming
independent of the West for resources. This attempt led them to begin looking at the
resource rich area of Southeast Asia that included possessions of the British Empire.
In 1937, the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Nanking Massacre
began to sway Western opinion against the Japanese. Great Britain, occupied with events
in Europe, had little time or the resources to deal with the potential Japanese threat in the
Pacific region. Likewise, America was in no position to resist the Japanese directly at this
point. Americans in general were also opposed to entering another costly conflict,
preferring to let the Europeans deal with their own mess. As a result, the Western powers
supplied the Chinese with money for their war supplies, hoping to stem the Japanese
advance. In 1940, the Japanese invaded French Indochina. Their goals were to stop the
influx of war supplies to China and to take control of the natural resources of the region.
The United States in turn placed an embargo on all manufactured goods and resources
going to Japan that it deemed to be war material. Oil was still allowed to be exported due
in large part to the belief that to restrict its sale to Japan would be considered an extreme
provocation. Aviation fuel, though, was on the list of goods embargoed.
The unmistakable escalation of Japanese aggression in the Pacific region forced
the United States to face the reality that war with Japan was a very distinct possibility.
American leadership was still uncertain at this point as to what they would do in the case
of war between the two nations. In 1940 following naval exercises, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (1882-1945) ordered the fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor had been

3

incredibly useful as a forward naval base, but it had never been primary fleet base. The
re-location of the Pacific fleet clearly was meant as a deterrent to further Japanese
aggression in the emerging Pacific theater. Japanese war planners now felt that a
preemptive strike against the Americans was necessary in order to ensure their plans on
moving into what they referred to as the Southern Area.2 This area included British
holding like Malaya and Singapore and the Japanese command believed that strikes
against these resource rich British territories would draw the Americans into a conflict.
In January 1941 the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku authored a paper that
would be the origin of the attack plan that the Japanese Combined Fleet would execute in
December of that same year. Yamamoto’s paper was unequivocal in its thesis. The
Imperial Japanese Navy had to strike first and strike hard. Yamamoto pointed to the fact
that the IJN had never won a scenario that involved reactionary tactics. As part of a
multi-pronged thrust into the Pacific the IJN and IJA would have to work together to take
key territories away from the West. One of the targets was Pearl Harbor. There
Yamamoto declared that the IJN should attack using naval airpower as its primary
offensive weapon and follow that success up with an extensive blockade conducted by
IJN submarines. Yamamoto then requested that a naval aviator not indoctrinated within
the traditional ideology of decisive naval battle doctrine to study the proposed project.
Yamamoto received the results of that feasibility study sometime in March or April of
1941. It was within this period that the order was given to begin drawing up the actual
battle plans for air attack on the naval base at Pearl Harbor.3

2

John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, 120. The Southern Area was the name the Japanese used to refer
to the countries of Southeast Asia that they felt could supply them with the raw resources they required to
continue their imperial endeavors.
3
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The Japanese, as part of an overall ongoing naval intelligence gathering effort at
the time, had sent naval officers under official cover as civilians to each of its embassies.
The officers would direct espionage operations in addition to actively gathering
intelligence themselves. In Hawaii this person was Yoshikawa Takeo. Yoshikawa’s
reason for being in Hawaii was because of this intelligence effort and not as a direct
result of the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact evidence shows that at the
same time Yoshikawa was arriving in Hawaii the first order to create an attack plan was
being issued in Japan. This did not mean that he did not contribute to the Pearl Harbor
attack plan. As his mission continued the intelligence he gathered would be utilized in the
plan that was developed.4
On a clear March afternoon in 1941 a Japanese liner nosed its way into a berth on
the Hawaiian Island of Oahu. As the passengers disembarked, an official of the Japanese
Consulate met a lone slim man in his late twenties. After receiving the traditional
Hawaiian lei greeting the young man, whose papers identified him as Morimura Tadashi,
was guided through customs by the consular agent who met him. Mormura was then
taken to the consulate on Nuuana Avenue. Once there Morimura was introduced to his
co-workers and shown to his residence within the consular compound. He was then given
a rather innocuous title at the consulate, one that both the Consul and Vice Consul had
known would hide his true task.
Morimura had spent years preparing for his real mission: to keep the Japanese
Navy informed of the readiness of the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor. He
had begun by familiarizing himself with the various military installations located in the
Hawaiian Islands while simultaneously studying English so that he could glean all the
4
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information possible from periodicals like the New York Times. He also studied naval
theory, read the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and studied Jane’s Fighting Ships,
memorizing the silhouettes of all the American vessels. His task was to monitor the
activities, movements, and daily routine of the American fleet. He would then send this
information back through the consulate in reports to Japan. Ultimately, this intelligence
would aide in the planned attack on Pearl Harbor.
Over the months Morimura painstakingly recorded the patterns of most of the U.S.
military activity on the islands. He never trespassed on government property and never
committed any outright acts of espionage. Instead, Morimura gathered all of his
intelligence through open sourcing and human intelligence. He was no different from the
local law enforcement and Federal analysts working in the United States today, or the
numerous attachés and businessmen working for the U.S. government observing the
goings on in whatever nation they are residing in. He gained valuable information from
local residents and servicemen at bars and in social environments, primarily as a result of
the openness of these targets. He combed through local, national, and international papers
to find corroborating data. He relied on his memory, avoiding cameras and notepads that
may have drawn attention to him.
Morimura also was careful in his intelligence gathering habits. He never overused
any one location or method. There was one exception. Morimura did have a preferred
restaurant, the Shunchu-ro, which sat on the side of Alewa Heights.5 That particular
establishment afforded him an excellent view of Ford Island and Hickam Field. It also
served to re-enforce his cover as a hard drinking, womanizing, Japanese government
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John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, 146; Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the
Far East, 1930-1945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997), 297.
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worker. Other times he would dress as a common day laborer and spend time in the cane
fields on the slopes of Aiea that conveniently overlooked the submarine facilities in Pearl.
These locations and techniques helped Morimura to gather the information that would be
critical to the success of the Japanese attack on December 7th of that same year.
The narrative above may read like a work of historical fiction, but these events
actually took place. Morimura Tadashi’s real name was Yoshikawa Takeo (1914-1993).
Yoshikawa provided the Imperial Japanese Navy with invaluable information, used to
plan its attack on the US Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. Yoshikawa’s intelligence
helped to eliminate other, less strategic, targets on the island so that the planners could
focus solely on the fleet at Pearl Harbor.6 The intelligence he provided may even have
resulted in the decision to use bombs on the American battleships in addition to
torpedoes.7 By the time of the attack Yoshikawa not only knew the names of most of the
American ships, but he also knew their schedules down to the day. The largely complete
picture that Yamamoto and his planners had of Pearl Harbor and American military
activity on the islands, thanks to Yoshikawa’s efforts, contributed directly to the success
of the attack on December 7th.
Yoshikawa was no slouch. He had been a graduate of the Imperial Japanese Naval
Academy and had served on capital ships in the Navy. Additionally, Yoshikawa had
undergone training in both submarines and naval aviation, but forced to retire early for
medical reasons cutting short a promising career. Approximately two years after his
discharge, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) approached him and offered him a position
6

One major mistake in the attack was the decision to cancel the third wave of attacks which would have
targeted Pearl Harbor’s repair facilities and storage depos.
7
Yoshikawa noted that the battleships were moored in a double row along Ford Island. This meant that
only the outboard row of ships could be attacked with torpedoes, aerial bombing would be necessary in
order to strike the inboard row of ships.
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in its intelligence division. Yoshikawa’s extensive naval training made him a valuable
asset and potentially the most valuable spy in Hawaii. Over the next few years
Yoshikawa studied everything that was available to him on the United States Navy and
its many Pacific bases. In 1940 he was given his assignment which posted him in Hawaii
and tasked him with keeping the IJN command informed of the current status of the U.S.
fleet. This assignment would end up becoming part of the overall strategy devised by
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku that called for a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbor as the
opening gambit of war with the U.S. As the only military asset in the Hawaiian Islands,
the intelligence that Yoshikawa passed on proved invaluable to Yamamoto in his
planning.8
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Chapter 1
Thesis
Yoshikawa Takeo’s activities in Hawaii represent a highly developed and
sophisticated approach to intelligence operations. His training and approach to his
mission was on par with Japan’s Western counterparts. Yet, Western scholars, both
British and American, have readily dismissed Japanese intelligence as faulty. Instead,
they focus on Western intelligence failures as being the source of Japanese successes in
the first half of the Second World War. This thesis will argue the opposite. It will argue
that the Japanese had an intelligence apparatus that was as developed as those possessed
by its Western counterparts. It will analyze the Japanese espionage operations, in
particular those of the Imperial Japanese Army, conducted in preparation for the Invasion
of Malaya. The battle will be used as a case study to analyze Japanese intelligence
contributions to the overall success of that military operation. It will focus heavily on the
contributions made by the famous Japanese intelligence unit F Kikan as related by its
commander Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908-1986) in his memoir F. Kikan: Japanese Intelligence
Operations in Southeast Asia during World War II. This thesis will analyze the
intelligence operations of F Kikan using the Intelligence cycle as defined by the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). This cycle is the same that was

9

implemented during the war. The ODNI has simply provided a clear and concise
definition of the individual steps involved and the methods of collection.9
Yoshikawa Takeo’s training and activities were not unique among the various
branches of Japanese intelligence. Instead, he is typical of the effort that the Japanese
exerted in order to field highly capable operatives. Despite the revelations of
Yoshikawa’s activities there is still considerable conjecture over the capabilities and
effectiveness of operatives like him and over Japanese intelligence as a whole. Some
historians like W.J. Holmes have credited the work Yoshikawa did as being vital to the
success to the strike on Pearl Harbor. Yet other historians like David Kahn have argued
that Yoshikawa was more interested in dalliances with local Japanese-American women
that life on the Hawaiian Islands provided him. Kahn’s analysis painted Yoshikawa as
being unhappy with both his assignment and the people with whom he worked. As a
result, Yoshikawa focused on his own personal gratification instead of tending to his
duties. R.B. Stinnet even goes so far as to claim that Imperial Japanese Army and Navy
intelligence officers were badly trained. The speculation that surrounds Yoshikawa’s
activities and achievements is representative of the larger, Western, view of Japanese
intelligence activities during World War II. When the subject of intelligence during the
war is brought up, scholars tend to go straight to speaking about the ingenious complexity
of the Enigma machine and the herculean efforts of the Allies to decipher it. In such
discussions the Germans often receive as much praise for their ingenuity as the Allied
9

Intelligence Is For Commanders, published in 1948 and authored by LTC Robert Glass and LTC Phillip
Davidson, is one of the first times the term Intelligence Cycle is used to describe the process that was being
utilized at that time. A process that in the authors’ understanding had roots all the way back in the mid-19th
century. The components of the cycle they recognized were 1) direction of collection effort; 2) Collection;
3) Processing information; 4) Use of Intelligence. All of which fell under the umbrella of the Mission. The
authors were presenting the concepts, ideas, and rules for the practice of intelligence. Clearly, they believed
that only by understanding the intelligence procedure could a commander fully realize the assistance he
could receive in accomplishing his mission.
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codebreakers. Meanwhile in any similar discussion about the Pacific war, historians
belittle and ignore Japanese intelligence efforts. This thesis will take a critical look at
Japanese intelligence capabilities and argue that they were better than given credit for
using an analysis of the intelligence operations that preceded the Battle of Malaya.
The following study will look at the Japanese development of their intelligence apparatus
in the years prior to the Second World War. It will examine their use of intelligence operations at
its onset. The thesis will look specifically at the Japanese intelligence systems employed prior to
and during the Battle of Malaya. The Invasion of Malaya, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, was a
pivotal event that occurred in late 1941. Both were decisive Japanese victories. In each case the
success of the Japanese forces has been credited to epic failures in Allied intelligence and
preparedness. Historian David Kahn has said that the Japanese intelligence services experienced
success in only the most extraordinary and propitious of conditions. The attack on Pearl Harbor,
often, is still referred to as “… the greatest shock ever sustained by the United States.”10 Western
sources have claimed that Japanese intelligence was faulty. This project will argue that in fact
Japanese intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed considerably to Japanese military
successes. It would be because of the development of severe organizational deficiencies, internal
failures, and inter-service rivalry during the second half of the conflict that Japan would fall
behind in the intelligence war and eventually succumb to defeat.

Exploration of Thesis
Not until the 1970s did the world learn of the complex role intelligence played in
the Allied victory in WWII. The story of intelligence operations during the Second World
War first started in 1973 with revelations about the Enigma cipher machine and the

10

David Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991): 150.
This article was published ten years before the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001, but the reasoning for
Kahn’s claim would still hold true today. Pearl Harbor is still the greater shock because it destroyed
America’s myth of invulnerability and the idea that it could remain isolated from the world.
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ULTRA program. Gustave Bertrand published his work Enigma ou la plus grande
énigme de la guerre 1939-1945 in that year and for the first time revealed the multinational effort that went into breaking the German cryptographic system. Bertrand’s book
led to the even larger disclosure of the critical role intelligence played in tactical,
strategic, and operational planning. For the first time scholars began to realize the
tremendous impact intelligence had on the events of WWII. This in turn led to a serious
revision to the historiography of the war.11
Britain followed suit in 1979, publishing its official history of intelligence
operations during the Second World War titled British Intelligence in the Second World
War. The multi-volume tome, edited by Sir Francis Harry Hinsley, illuminated the extent
to which the British used intelligence operations during the war and their importance to
its outcome. In particular, the work goes into extensive detail about the use of
information and dis-information. Allied deceptions at Normandy, counter-intelligence
operations, and the decryption of Enigma are all detailed in its pages. Because of the
American desire to keep its own intelligence capabilities a secret, British Intelligence was
limited in its scope to events and actors in the European Theater of Operations (ETO).12
Those initial works have heavily influenced the World War II narrative. That
influence is apparent today in works like Andrew Roberts’ 2009 publishing, The Storm of
War: A New History of the Second World War. In his book Roberts illustrated how the
relationship between German General Erwin Rommel and British Field Marshal Bernard
11

Gustave Bertrand’s work, translated as Enigma, or the Greatest Enigma of the War of 1939-1945,
resulted in a tremendous demand to reveal the rest of the story on the breaking of the cipher. It also created
tremendous pressure to disclose the entirety of the Ultra story.
12
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Montgomery had to be re-evaluated. Montgomery “… had the invaluable advantage of
being able to read Rommel’s Enigma communications, Montgomery knew how short the
Germans were of men, ammunition, food and above all fuel.”13 The Allied victory in the
ETO is now understood to have been due in large part to its extensive intelligence
apparatus. Since Bertrand’s original revelations the overall contribution of intelligence to
operations in the ETO has emerged as a complex and detailed picture. The intricate
nature of this story is possible because of the unparalleled access that the Allies had to
Axis, in particular German, personnel and records at the end of the conflict. The result
has been that scholars from all walks of academia have been able to ascertain the
strengths and weaknesses of the various intelligence organizations and the impact that
they had on operations and decision-making. Historians in particular have the ability to
examine and understand the cultural, bureaucratic, and ideological factors that influenced
the operation of intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, the same conditions that added to
our understanding of the intelligence war in the ETO did not exist in the Pacific theater at
the end of the war.14
The United States and its allies did not get the same kind of access to the Japanese
personnel and documents that they had gotten in the ETO. Unlike the conditions in
Europe where geographic distances were relatively short and the Allies had invaded the
very capital of their foe, the Pacific Ocean is a vast expanse of nothingness dotted
infrequently by small spits of land. One of the results of the combination of the
13
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geography of the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) and the overall American strategy
to defeat the Japanese was that no Allied soldier actually set foot on Japanese home soil
prior to the surrender in Tokyo Bay. Thanks to the large geographic separation there was
over a month delay between the end of the war in the Pacific and the arrival of the first
occupation forces in September of 1945. In that interim period Japanese intelligence
personnel had been busy. The intelligence branch of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)
had embarked on an extensive burn campaign that destroyed the majority of their
cryptanalytic work. Code breakers went underground. Authorities removed the names of
intelligence operatives and personnel from rosters, or declared them dead. These
preparations allowed the Japanese to feign ignorance once the occupiers arrived and
began asking questions. The Americans too, were planning on playing “stupid” so to
speak. The U.S. had been successful in the breaking of Japanese codes. As a result the US
knew that the Japanese were not as incompetent as they were playing. The Americans
participated in the charade because to reveal the Japanese duplicity in this matter could
have potentially disclosed their own extensive capabilities. A giant game of balderdash
ensued. Complicating the situation were the extreme racial prejudices held at the time. In
the end Nazis were still white Europeans who had become misguided. The Japanese on
the other hand were viewed as sub-human as a result of their Eastern origin, and
dehumanized further by wartime propaganda. Ultimately, both sides were able to protect
their secrets successfully from the each other, leaving historians with a wholly
incomplete story.15
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Despite the fragmentary nature of the available information on Japanese
intelligence during WW II a satisfactory history can still be constructed. There is an
abundance of information readily available for current historians to utilize. The National
Institute for Defense Studies in Shinjuku, Tokyo Japan houses an extensive collection of
documents dating from 1865 forward. They are divided between the army, navy, and the
Ministry of Defense. Many of the records are available digitally. Unfortunately, a greater
number of them have yet to be translated and scanned as reading eighty-year-old hand
writing presents a unique challenge, especially when it is in the Japanese language. The
U.S. National Archives houses the World War II Collection of Seized Documents: Japan.
This collection consists of copies of everything brought to America at the end of the war.
Many of these records also go back to the mid-1860s. Additionally, there are the
documents that have been emerging thanks to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act which
also encompasses information related to Japan. Finally, there exist an impressive number
of oral and first person histories published in both English and Japanese. Fujiwara
Iwaichi’s memoir, which will be used heavily in this work, is one such example. With
this information it should be possible to create a moderately detailed summary of
Japanese intelligence capabilities prior to and during the war. Furthermore, it may be
possible to construct a framework with which it may be possible to start telling a more
nuanced history of the subject.16
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Current scholars in the field claim that it is impossible to form a thorough
understanding of Japanese intelligence during the war. This is a direct result of the
fragmented nature of the information possessed. Edward Drea has asserted that the
evidence possessed is circumstantial at best, and “… there cannot be any certainty about
how the Japanese used their cryptographic treasures.”17 Drea also questions whether any
cryptanalytic successes the Japanese did have even mattered due to the infighting and
bureaucratic issues that divided the intelligence services. These issues, while present at
the start of the conflict, would not dominate Japan’s intelligence landscape until the latter
half of the war. This claim writes off all operational failure as a result of internal
disorganization and strife while simultaneously denoting that the intelligence
organizations were failures. At the very least the claim marginalizes the early pre-war and
initial wartime efforts and successes the Japanese did have in the intelligence arena. To
subjectively discount the intelligence abilities of the Japanese based on operational
outcomes, missing data, and the end result of the war does a disservice to both sides in
the conflict. Despite the fact the Japanese ultimately lost the intelligence war, it is
essential that historians construct as accurate a narrative as possible. To that end, it is
possible to create such a history by using the available primary and secondary
information.
This thesis would not be the first attempt at piecing together a history in this
manner. In fact, it draws its inspiration from the work of Revolutionary War historian
Woody Holton. In his book Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making
of the American Revolution in Virginia Holton successfully presents the argument that the
shiriizu (Winter 1985), where a former cryptanalyst from the 1940s, Kamaga Kazuo, related his
experiences.
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Virginia Founding Fathers were forced into acting by those who were socially and
economically beneath them. Traditionally, the Founders are viewed as having led the
common people who have been voiceless in most of history. The lack of primary
evidence that surrounded these groups did not deter Holton. Holton constructed the
framework for his argument using what does exist: newspapers, records of town meetings,
reports on social events, and commentary in the journals and personal writing of the elites.
From there he was able to extrapolate the unknowns to form a coherent argument that
provides a new understanding of the events and forces that motivated the Founders. In a
similar manner, this thesis will look at the knowns and attempt to extrapolate the
unknowns in an effort to create a more thorough understanding of Japanese intelligence
operations. By analyzing information that is directly linked and tangentially connected to
Japanese intelligence efforts, it may be possible to construct the necessary framework to
better analyze the Japanese intelligence operations of WWII.
Review of Literature/Historiography
Starting in the 1970s with the revelations about the ULTRA project, historians
have been examining the role of intelligence during World War II. The impact of intelligence on
the war has been scrutinized from the lowest level operations to the creation of overall strategy.
From this analysis, a general picture has emerged, at least in regards to the European Theater of
Operations. The Allies enjoyed considerable superiority over their opponents in the field of
intelligence in this picture. The contribution of Allied intelligence operations to the Allied war
effort was a major facilitator in their eventual victory. The deciphering of the Enigma cypher and
Operation Bodyguard are both prime examples of the importance of intelligence to the outcome
of the war. Furthermore, access to the Axis powers’ records and personnel after the war have
helped historians to craft a thorough understanding of the many intelligence factors that
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contributed to the pursuit of the war. This work has created an understanding of the many aspects
that constituted Hitler’s and the German’s conduct of the war. This is not the case with the study
of intelligence in the Pacific theater.18
The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based
almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers using Western sources. This work heavily
favors the idea that early Allied failures were solely a result of unpreparedness and their later
successes derived wholly from their achievements. Central to this idea is the theme of overall
ineffectiveness in the Japanese intelligence services. At the start of the war the Japanese racked
up a remarkable string of successes. The vast majority of intelligence histories, though, refuse to
credit the Japanese and their intelligence efforts for setting the stage for their victories. Most
historians point instead to the flaws and weaknesses of the West as the as the primary basis for
the Japanese superiority at places like Malaya and Pearl Harbor. Almost no credit is given to the
Japanese for their performance, especially at the onset of the war, instead Allied errors are
credited. The work of historians like David Kahn tends to support this view. Kahn has dismissed
Japanese SIGINT efforts entirely and overall has painted a picture of the Japanese being
ineffective, incapable, and developmentally behind the West in terms of intelligence capability.
Then there are a select few historians, such as Edward Drea, who feel it is impossible to make any
real determination about the effectiveness of Japanese intelligence capabilities based on the
available evidence. There is still another line of thought, though, that has begun to emerge.
Spearheaded by Dr. Ken Kotani, this line of thinking argues that Japanese intelligence
organizations were not inept. Instead they suffered from a lack of status, central organization, and
efficiency.19 Edward Drea also raised this idea in the conclusion of his paper on Japanese
communications intelligence between 1920 and 1941 when he stated that “Whether or not
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Japanese cryptanalytic victories mattered in an intelligence system divided against itself is a
question that awaits an answer.”20
The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor is one of the most widely studied intelligence failures
of World War II. The common conclusion is that there were plenty of warnings available prior to
the attack that signaled Japanese intentions. In fact, frequently the assertion is that the U.S. had
ample information about Japanese intentions because of intercepted communications and broken
codes. Gordon Prange’s 1981 book At Dawn We Slept examines the events leading up to the
attack and his effort focus on the gathering of intelligence during the period prior to December 7 th.
His work is valuable in helping to understand the revisionist viewpoint of the events. The primary
claim that has manifested because of looking at the intelligence America gathered prior to the
attack is that the Japanese success was the result of an American intelligence failure. David
Kahn’s article, “The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor”, is an example of this assessment. He
directly attributes the success of the attack to two major defects in American operations. The first
was the lack of centralized intelligence and the second a lack of co-ordination between the
military commands.21 This assessment though continually fails to realize the scope of Japanese
preparations prior to the attack and in doing so reveals its major flaw.
Edward Drea, an eminent scholar who specializes in Japanese military affairs, takes a
slightly different approach. In his article “Reading Each Other’s Mail: Japanese Communication
Intelligence, 1920-1941” he points out that currently there exists a fragmented history of Japanese
intelligence accomplishments. This is the result of several factors that when combined may,
potentially, make resolving this convoluted and fractured story incredibly difficult. Key to the
mess historians currently must deal with is the fact that Japanese intelligence organizations
pursued a vigorous and thorough burn policy at the end of the war. Compounding this was the
fact that many of the surviving agents remained in hiding for fear of reprisals and have now
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passed on, leaving their stories untold. Drea maintains that a thorough understanding of the
dynamics that existed between intelligence and military planning is not possible. His assertion is
based on the belief that historians possess little of the necessary evidence and that what they do
have is circumstantial at best. Instead of making assertions one way or another, Drea’s work
attempts to describe the known and expand on that knowledge. This allows him in the end to push
aside the assertion that Japanese intelligence was wholly inept. Instead, Drea points out that it is
now known Japanese intelligence was far more successful than previously credited. The question
instead is whether that success mattered or not due to deficiencies in the organization of the
intelligence system.22
Dr. Ken Kotani has no patience for the depiction of Japanese intelligence as being
incompetent or for the claim that Allied failures alone spawned Japanese success. In his book
Japanese Intelligence in World War II he argues that the officers of Japanese intelligence were
accomplished at performing their job. He posits that their downfall was a result of insufficient
resources and a de-centralized intelligence organization. The fact that operations staff looked
down on intelligence officers, coupled with the severe internal competition between the various
organizations, only served to exacerbate the issues. Kotani points out that despite the contribution
of intelligence officers in multiple tactical successes, like Pearl Harbor, they were not allowed to
take part in strategic planning. The author points to events like the invasion of French Indochina
as an example. The 1st group, operations, ignored intelligence’s opposition to the invasion and
kept them in the dark throughout the entire planning process. Despite a successful outcome, the
invasion resulted in America cutting off the all-important export of oil to Japan. This was a
potential outcome intelligence had feared.
Kotani and his works are only the most recent additions to the literature that originated in
Japan itself. Like America, intelligence studies in Japan have been for the most part ignored until
recently. What literature does exist offers vital clues to answering the question about why Japan
22
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lost the intelligence war. In 1994, retired Colonel Ariga Tsutao published his book Nihon Riku
Kai Gun no Jyoho Kiko Sono Katsudo (The Organization and Activities of the IJA and IJN). This
work was instrumental in opening the way for increased work in the field. By far the largest work
done on the history of Japanese Intelligence was Rikugun Nakano Gakko (Nakano Army School)
and published in 1978. The book is a wide-ranging survey of the espionage activities and training
of the IJA. The book spans the time from the Sino-Japanese War to the end of the Second World
War. Graduates of the school, known for turning out highly trained and competent intelligence
officers, compiled and edited the work.
Many former Japanese officers have left us with their memoirs. These important works
provide an inside look at Japanese intelligence activities. Several volumes appeared just prior to
and during the Pacific War. They dealt with the long history of Japanese Counter-Intelligence
efforts. Nihon Bocho shi (History of Japanese Counter-Intelligence) traces the history of the
subject back to the eighth century. The Japanese Military Police, known as the Kenpei-Tai, edited
their own official history in 1939. In 1975, well after the end of World War II, the Military Police
Officers Association edited another volume entitled Nihon Kenpei Seishi (Official Japanese
Military Police History). They put out yet a third history in the early 1980s. These works go into
significant detail about the covert operations that took place in Manchuria, China, and Southeast
Asia.
The Japanese Military Police were not the only former combatants that were writing
memoirs. Several members of both the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese Army
also wrote about their experiences before, during, and after the Pacific War. Retired Captain
Motonao Samejima and retired Lieutenant Kenichi Nakamuta both left copious amounts of
personal papers that recollected their codebreaking missions during the Pacific War. Motonao’s
work was titled Moto Gunreibu Tsushin Kacho no Kaiso (Memoir of an ex-Chief of
Communications, Navy General Staff) and published in 1981, while Kenichi’s effort was titled
Joho Shikan no Kaiso (Memoir of an Intelligence Officer) and was released in 1974. In 1951
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former Vice Admiral Toshiyuki Yokoi wrote about the IJN’s codebreaking efforts starting in the
1920s and proceeding through the end of the Pacific War. The book was titled Nihon no
Kimitsushitsu (Japanese Black Chamber). Imai Takeo, a former Major General, wrote Showa no
Boryaku (Conspiracies in the Showa Era) in 1967. His book revealed some of the intelligence
operations that the IJA had been running in China and Manchuria. In 1972 retired Captain Yuzuru
Sanematsu wrote Joho Senso (Intelligence War) in which he described his duties as part of the
IJN’s intelligence section. What makes his work interesting is that he also spent time serving on
Navy General Staff.23
It is apparent that the current view of Japanese intelligence operations during World War
II is flawed. It is unacceptable to assert that the only reason the Japanese enjoyed any success was
due to the failures of others. Even though the Allied advantage in the Pacific was obvious much
sooner than in Europe, there is strong evidence that Japanese intelligence was not the problem.
The question then becomes where the problem, if there was one, existed? The question is not
easily answered because the role of Japanese intelligence organizations and their effectiveness is
murky at best. This is a result of the combination of several factors. The destruction of the vast
majority of intelligence documents at the end of the war and the reclusiveness of Japanese
operatives after the war are two of these components. Edward Drea feels because of this lack of
evidence it is currently impossible to make a determination on the effectiveness of Japanese
intelligence during the war. For Drea, and for this research, the question to answer is, what effect
did the organization and structure of the intelligence services have on overall Japanese
intelligence and military performance? Answering this question can give historians a more
accurate and complete picture of Japanese intelligence during World War II.
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The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based
almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The narrative as presented thus suffers
from fundamental flaws. The most important of these flaws is that effective Japanese intelligence
operations do not receive credit for the success of events like the attack on Pearl Harbor and the
Invasion of Malaya. Instead, their triumphs belong to American and Allied intelligence failures.
While this may in part be true, to ignore the intelligence operations of the Japanese as wholly
ineffective is a mistake. What attention granted to any victories the different Japanese
intelligence organizations achieved often comes in the form of conspiracy books. Books like
Charles Beard’s President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941, John Toland’s Infamy, and
Betrayal at Pearl Harbor by James Rusbridger. In fact, many Anglo-American historians have
instead chosen to focus on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the cause of their early
failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence efforts. Much of this
research does not consider the extensive preparations and training the Japanese intelligence
organizations and military undertook in the years prior to World War II and is based heavily on
Western sources. This information alone should call into question the assertion that Allied
failures alone were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes.

Intelligence Overview
If paying to poke someone is the world’s oldest profession, then paying someone
to poke around in somebody else’s business is easily the second oldest. Espionage, the
oldest subset of intelligence gathering, has a history as old as mankind. The Ancient
Greeks used spies extensively as did the Roman Empire. The ancient writings of generals,
philosophers, and advisors often contained advice on the use of espionage as part of a
successful military strategy. The Chinese classic The Art of War by Sun-Tzu and the
Artasastra by the Indian philosopher Chanakya are both notable examples of classic
treatises on the art of intelligence gathering. The ancient Egyptians were also noted for
23

having an extremely adept intelligence system. Espionage is even found within the Bible.
Recorded in the book of Numbers is the story of Joshua, Caleb, and the twelve spies sent
forth by Moses into the Promised Land to assess whether or not it was suitable for the
Israelites.
During the 14th through 16th centuries espionage continued to be practiced
extensively by both the East and West. Like previous shoguns, the Tokugawa shogunate
of Japan employed espionage to manage and control the daimyo and samurai. The
shogunate realized that it needed some manner of discovering internal corruption and
dissent throughout Japan. The Metsuke were officially the censors of the Tokugawa
shogunate. Unofficially they operated as the shogun’s personal intelligence agency. They
were tasked with reporting any events, situations, or conversations back to officials in
Edo that showed evidence of dissent, corruption, or maladministration. They functioned
in a similar fashion to the manner in which attachés do in the modern intelligence world.
In the West the efforts of the shogunate are embodied most famously in the form of the
legendary ninja. In reality the shogunate’s actual efforts were much more practical and
far less fanciful. The Mongols also used espionage extensively during their conquests in
Asia and Europe. Meanwhile, in the Americas, the Aztecs learned how to use the
individuals in their society that were in charge of commerce as spies. Additionally, prior
to a battle or conflict, the Aztecs would send members of their own tribe out among their
enemy. These individuals would speak the local dialect and wear the local attire, not
unlike human intelligence (HUMINT) assets today. 24
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Since its incorporation, the definition of intelligence and its purpose have changed
little. Intelligence is the information, regardless of source, collected from both within and
outside a parent nation. That data can pertain to direct or indirect threats, to the parent
nation, its people, its property, and may include any number of the aforementioned
circumstances or include them all. The intelligence may also involve reporting on the
development of new technologies, offensive or defensive, the propagation of weapons
and weapon systems within a nation, region or hemisphere, and more recently, the
proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The accumulated
information is then processed and used to understand a perceived opponent or threat, to
discern the consequences of any action taken politically or militarily, inform negotiations
and policy decisions, aid internal security and first responders. The process by which all
of this is done is now known as the Intelligence Cycle.25
In U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013, a report written and published
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Cycle is defined as
“the process of developing raw information into finished intelligence for use by
policymakers, military commanders, and other consumers in decision making.”26 It is a
cyclical six step process that is designed to be dynamic and repeatable at the same time.
Those six steps in order are: 1) Planning and Direction; 2) Collection; 3) Processing and
Exploitation; 4) Analysis and Production; 5) Dissemination and; 6) Evaluation. The final
step is unique in that is occurs at the end of each of the previous steps in addition to
occurring for the process as a whole.27
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The first step, referred to as the Planning and Direction stage, provides the
impetus for the entire intelligence cycle. In the modern parlance direction often comes
from a specific requirement provided by the consumer for specific project. In this
instance the direction aspect precedes the planning phase. The refined intelligence that is
provided to the consumer is referred to as the product and it may consist of any number
of things individually or as a combination of them. Some examples of products are full
reports, graphics, and raw data that has been collected and processed but not analyzed.
Depending on the customer’s requirements the intelligence organization(s) assigned with
generating the product will proceed with planning.28
The second step in the Intelligence cycle is the gathering of the raw data for the
project. There are five primary sources of intelligence. They are Geospatial Intelligence
(GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence
(MASINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Data
collection is conducted in a manner that assembles information related to the product in
as many of the aspects of intelligence as possible. Sources of information can range from
newspapers and social networking sites to complex clandestine aerial surveillance and
satellite imagery. Once the intelligence needed to produce the finished product has been
amassed the next step in the cycle can begin.
In the third step of the Intelligence Cycle, Processing and Exploitation, the raw
data from the previous step is refined into a form that is more readily usable.29 The
Processing and Exploitation phase of the Intelligence Cycle uses highly trained and
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specialized individuals and complex equipment to make the collected intelligence usable
by the analyst in the next step. During this step imagery is interpreted, data is translated if
necessary, if possible it is decrypted, and then it is organized in a manner that makes
analysis both easier and more efficient.30
The fourth step in the Intelligence Cycle is Analysis and Production. As with the
preceding step this one also utilizes highly trained and specialized people and equipment
to give meaning to the refined intelligence. The processed intelligence is synthesized into
a finished product that produces actionable intelligence.31 In some instances this step may
be skipped as a result of time constraints or the requirements of the customer. An
excellent example of this occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy
only needed the actual quantity of Soviet equipment in Cuba and facts on Soviet activities.
As a result no analysis was required.32
Dissemination of the completed intelligence product to the customer is the fifth
step in the Intelligence Cycle. There are multiple methods of dissemination in today’s
world. Hardcopy, electronic distribution, and formal briefings are all used. Most finished
intelligence will be distributed through multiple if not all avenues. It is during this phase
when evaluation may uncover gaps in the intelligence and identify new pertinent
questions that need answered in order to fulfill the consumer’s original requirements.
More often than not, the Intelligence Cycle begins anew at this point.33
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The final step in the Intelligence Cycle is Evaluation. This step is unique in the
fact that it exists in a specific point within the cycle but also throughout it. At the end of
every cycle feedback is acquired and used to refine both the process and the intelligence
as whole. At the same time constant evaluation exists in every step in order to better
fulfill the customers’ requirements in the present and the future. The feedback is used to
refine techniques and activities and to develop new more effective methods of collecting
intelligence. This step is vital to addressing the dynamic environment of intelligence
gathering.34
Intelligence gathering falls into five basic categories as previously mentioned.
They are HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, and MASINT. Despite the modern
naming and acronym conventions these practices have been around for most of human
history. The one exception is MASINT, not formally recognized until 1986, and where
the other four categories collect direct evidence, MASINT tends to be indirect. Together
these different types of intelligence and their collection techniques provide intelligence
organizations with all of the raw data they require to fulfill their missions.
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is technically derived
information. It relies on data sources other than imagery and signals. MASINT is a
product of the technological age we live in and often relies on optical information in
visual spectrums that humans cannot perceive. It also includes radio frequency analysis,
acoustics, seismology, and the use of material sciences in achieving its objectives. The
tools used for MASINT collection include computers with advanced software suites,
satellites, and drones. The final intelligence product for MASINT is a result of the
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information collected through these means.
34
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Since MASINT is a product of the past thirty years it will not be included in the
discussion.35
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information via a human
source. This is the category that the majority of people think of when they think of
intelligence work. James Bond is the epitome of this, idea, style of spy. In HUMINT is
much broader than this preconceived understanding. HUMINT is the only one of the five
categories where its collectors interact directly with the information sources- assetsdirecting their activities and conversations. The greatest advantage provided by HUMINT
is the ability of its collectors to obtain information that is otherwise impossible to
procure.36
Human Intelligence encompasses a wide range of activities. It can be high-level
national security information all the way down to low-level unit or individual specific
missions. HUMINT is further divided into two main categories, overt collection and
covert collection. Overt collection includes but is not limited to the debriefing of persons
who travelled to locations and nations of interest, diplomatic reports from embassies, law
enforcement reports on criminal activities, and reports on host country officials’ reactions
to U.S. policy. In overt collections the collector meets openly with sources and declares
their position as an official representative of the U.S. Government.37
Covert operations, often-referred to as clandestine operations, are those conducted
in secret on foreign soil.38 The collections officer, usually under the cover of a NOC
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(Non-Official Cover), will attempt to develop discreetly a relationship with a source that
is close to the desired information. Ultimately, the goal is to get that source to divulge the
intelligence that the collections officer’s nation desires. The methods used in this type of
operation can vary. The source may be told of the collecting individual’s national
affiliation, they may be persuaded via moral or ethical arguments, and the collection
officer may utilize temptation in the form of vice or carnal pleasure. Money can also be a
powerful motivator. Finally, blackmail is never out of the question. Once recruited the
source is tightly controlled to protect both the collections officer and the source
themselves. It is also imperative for the political safety of the nation doing the collecting
that the operation eludes detection. This is one of the reasons that covert operatives often
operate under a NOC and if captured are disavowed. This process if most often the
longest and most time consuming, often taking years, but often yields the most actionable
intelligence.39
GEOINT is the acronym for geospatial intelligence and encompasses the
exploitation and analysis of imagery as well as the exploitation and analysis of geospatial
information. Variations of GEOINT have been around for as long as warring states have
had armies. In the earliest times this involved the scouting and mapping of terrain. The
result being the ability to pick positions and locations for battle that were favorable to
one’s self. With the advent of photography imagery analysis comes into being. The most
famous of which might be the pioneer aviators of WW1 taking reconnaissance photos of
the trench works and lines of opposing forces. Today with the advent of satellites and
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multi-spectrum video imagery GEOINT has entered a completely new realm and is one
of the most important information sources intelligence agencies have at their disposal.40
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is derived from all the information that is
publicly available. The data that is collected, processed through the intelligence cycle,
and disseminated to the appropriate audience in a timely manner. OSINT pulls from a
wide variety of sources: Newspapers, magazines, TV, social media, internet and
computer based information, government reports, official data, directories and other
forms of public data, Grey Literature, observation and reporting, and the availability of
worldwide satellite imagery such as Google Earth.41
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is the data that is collected from all data
transmissions. This includes Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic
Intelligence (ELINT) and Foreign Instrumentation Intelligence (FISINT). COMINT
involves analyzing traffic patterns. This was particularly useful in both World Wars as it
provided a means to locate enemy naval units in the period before radio direction finding.
It is also useful in determining who is involved with whom and what a potential hierarchy
may be. It helps to establish links between different groups and can potentially reveal
some of the meaning within the communication. FISINT is obtained by intercepting
foreign electromagnetic transmissions. It involves such things such as telemetry data,
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beacons, and video data links. Finally, ELINT is derived from electronic signals such as
RADAR and other non-communicative signals.42
Applying this intelligence model to the Japanese Pearl Harbor intelligence
operations makes it clear that they were some of the finest of the war. First and foremost
Japanese leadership utilized intelligence in their operational planning. This was
something that would disappear as the war drew on and internal power struggles
escalated. Yoshikawa Takeo’s mission in Hawaii is an excellent example of what can be
learned by simply using openly available information, OSINT. It also stands as an
example of top-notch HUMINT work. Yoshikawa’s frequent sightseeing trips around the
islands allowed him to view and document US military installations from various vantage
points. Restaurants, hotels, and even parks with “picturesque” views of Pearl Harbor
allowed him to chart the numbers and locations of United States Navy (USN) ships. They
also allowed him to keep track of their comings and goings. The various bars and dining
establishments frequented by USN personnel gave Yoshikawa the opportunity to verify
his observations and learn of new developments on the bases. American servicemen
seemed more than willing to talk about things that to them appeared harmless. Yoshikawa
also looked to newspapers and local publications that often detailed the stationing and
deployment of vessels. In addition to the HUMINT, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
was also using Radio Direction Finding (RDF) to plot the deployment of USN
warships.43 All of this intelligence and more would provide the basis for the attack that
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Admiral Onishi Takijiro, Commander Genda Minoru, and Admial Yamamoto Isoroku
planned.
The attack on Pearl Harbor, though, was just a small piece of a larger Japanese
thrust into the Pacific. Pearl Harbor for America was a monumental failure and marked
the country’s entrance into a war that it had not wanted. The reality was the attack, while
important, was a side attraction to the larger invasion of Southeast Asia and its resource
rich territories. The topic itself has also been well trod. Therefore in this work the
intelligence activities of the Japanese leading up to and during the Battle of Malaya, an
often-overlooked action, will be analyzed. The operations discussed will be classified
into one of the four defined categories of SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, and OSINT. The
success of each will then be assessed according to how they contributed to Japan’s final
victory in its Malayan campaign. The intelligence system employed by the Japanese will
be examined and its effectiveness will be judged using Intelligence Cycle presented here.
The results will then be included in the overall analysis of Japanese intelligence
operations.
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Chapter 2
Historical Background: Japan’s Rise to Imperial Power
In 1868 the last feudal Japanese government came to an end and imperial rule was
revived. The emperor, though, was more of a figurehead in the same vein that the British
monarchy is today. Real political power rested with the newly established national
assembly. The establishment of the Meiji Restoration soon followed. Its beginning also
signaled the start of Japan’s rapid transformation into a modern regional imperial power.
The Meiji Restoration was a vast plan of social, political, and technological reforms
triggered by the realization that the nation lagged far behind its Western counterparts. By
the 1890s Japan emerged as an economic powerhouse that stood on equal footing with
many of the Western powers. Japan accomplished in thirty years what it had taken the
West almost two hundred years to do. Practically overnight, its economy and industry
modernized. This revolution was reacting, in large part, to the threat that the Western
colonial powers presented. The Japanese had seen how China was carved up for the
West’s for own economic benefit. They also remembered how helpless they were to
Commodore Matthew Perry’s demands when he visited Edo Bay in 1853.
A profound sense of nationalism motivated the men who helped to bring down the
Tokugowa Shogunate in 1867 and revive the emperor. They had been radicalized by the
various events of the previous seventeen years, were angry at Japan’s position in the
world as well as their own, and desired to change things. Men like Yamagata Aritomo,
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who desired to establish Japan’s place among the world’s powers in order to protect its
independence and rights, or Itō Hirabumi who often voiced the desire to make Japan the
equal of any Western nation. These overlapping motives became the basis and driving
force behind a series of missions both at home and abroad designed to bring Japan up to
par with the rest of the world and that fueled the progress of the Meiji Restoration.
Yamagata Aritomo had been a leader in the sōnnō jōi movement in the 1850s and
helped to form a volunteer militia that had drawn from all of Japan’s social classes.44
That regiment, called the Kiheitai, had been successful in both the Shimonoseki War
(1863-1864) and in the Boshin Civil War in 1866.45 From these experiences Yamagata
made a strong case for Japan creating a Western style conscript army. In 1869 and 1870
he visited Europe and observed both the French and Prussian armies. His experiences
with these modern conscript armies reinforced his leaning towards the formation of such
a military in Japan. Yamagata’s observations on the benefits of the conscript army were
essential to the development of his belief that Japan should adopt modern military
practices and form a national army. The advantages of a conscript army that so appealed
to Yamagata included: fast mobilization, complete support of the state by the population,
formation of loyalty to the nation versus an individual, and the creation of national
unity.46
During the first year of the Meiji period both the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) were formally established. In terms of being
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modern military services, though, both were still lacking. Yamagata spent an enormous
amount of energy attempting to rectify this situation within the Army. Upon his return
from Europe in 1870 he was appointed the Vice-Minister of Military Affairs. One of the
first things that he did was to pass the Conscription Ordinance. This law was similar to
French conscription legislation. It mandated compulsory service for all males twenty
years of age. It was a tremendous step towards the disenfranchisement of the hereditary
warrior classes. It also opened the door for social advancement based on skill and
opportunity. More importantly it moved the people of Japan towards a more nationalistic
fealty.
Yamagata’s trips to the West were some of the most influential of the series of
foreign missions whose goal was to advance Japan. The Iwakura expedition potentially
was the most important. It, more than anything else, shaped Japan’s future economically,
socially, and politically. In 1871 Iwakura Tomomi led a group of forty-nine Japanese
government leaders on an extended trip through the West. Fifty-eight students some of
whom were tasked with remaining behind as international students for several years
accompanied them. The group focused on learning about the West. Its primary objective
was to learn the secrets of the West: How did the West arrive at the condition it was in
presently? How could Japan reach modernity on an equivalent scale and place itself as an
equal among the advanced nations of the West? The answers to those questions pointed
Japan down a path that embraced technological progress and colonial conquest. They had
keenly observed that not all Western countries were equally modern and those that were
not, often fell victim to those that were. To that end the Japanese went about observing
and acquiring the scientific and technological advancements of the West for themselves.
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Once they had them, they studied them, understood them, and then improved upon them.
It was not be long before Japan announced itself to the modern world.
The impetus for the diplomatic missions to the West was Japan’s changing ideas
about its place in the Pacific and its relation to its regional neighbors. The Japanese, after
witnessing how Europe had carved up China, had realized that they needed to advance as
a nation technologically, socially, and economically. But, they were not sure what type of
nation they were destined to become. The Iwakura mission more than any other defined
what path that national change would take. The late nineteenth century saw an increase in
the aggressiveness of Western imperial designs in the East. As the United States and the
major powers of Europe had come to realize after several large-scale military conflicts,
the strength of the national economy augmented the capability of a nation to achieve
political unity in its populace and to exercise its military might. To that end, this period
saw an increase in colonial empire building. The belief of the colonizing nations was that
the possession of vast colonial territories contributed to the wealth and growth of the
parent nation. As a result, Africa was quickly consumed by European powers. The US
expanded into the Pacific and took Hawaii in 1893 and both the US and Europe then
began to divide Asia. The US and Germany competed for influence in places like the
Marshall Islands, France brought Vietnam under its umbrella, and Britain folded Burma
into its empire.
The West’s belligerent encroachment into the territories of the East forced Japan
to reassess its relations with both Eastern and Western nations. Yamagata Aritomo was
once again at center stage. His ever-pragmatic worldview led him to see Japan’s
neighbors as backwards and weak. Yamagata viewed them all as easy victims for
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Western colonial ambitions similar to the Eastern European nations he and others had
observed. Korea, though, drew his attention more than any other nation. Korea’s location
posed an immediate threat to Japan’s national security in his opinion. In Yamagata’s
mind Japan needed to create a buffer around its possessions that was essential to
maintaining its security. Korea, as a peninsula, protruded into Yamagata’s buffer zone. In
order to defend the national interests and security of Japan, Yamagata introduced an
ambitious plan for the rapid expansion of its military forces. His plan also included the
development of corresponding intelligence services.47
Japanese Intelligence Development (1868-1941)
The development of the various Japanese intelligence organizations coincided
with its rise to imperial power. Early on, the Japanese realized that effective intelligence
gathering was paramount to their planned success. 1868, the first year of the Meiji
Restoration, marks the formal establishment of the Imperial Japanese Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Army. From their beginnings each possessed and controlled its own
intelligence apparatus. While the military technology of Europe was new and at times
unknown to the Japanese, the art of intelligence gathering was not. For over a thousand
years Japanese military leadership had followed the maxims contained in Sun Tzu’s The
Art of War. One of the most poignant and perpetually relevant dicta of the text was that
for one to be successful in battle, one must know his enemy as they knew himself. To that
end the IJA had commenced intelligence gathering operations in China by the mid-1870s.
Yamagata utilized information obtained from formal operations such as those performed
by Fukushima Yasumasa and from informal operations performed by secret societies like
the Genyosha.
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General Baron Fukushima Yasumasa (1852-1919) was a key figure in Japan’s
early intelligence history. Fukushima was a native of Matsumoto in the Nagano
Prefecture. One of his earliest assignments upon entering the Japanese army in 1878 was
a posting as military attaché to the Japanese legation in China. It was during this time that
he led one of Japan’s first intelligence rides, modeled after those of the great adventurers
of the West, to India.48 In 1887 Yasumasa was posted as an attaché in Berlin. In 1892 he
was recalled home and took fifteen months to cross Siberia alone. The route that
Yasumasa followed took him over Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. During his travels
he kept detailed notes of everything that he was observing. The resulting reports served to
feed the already growing anti-Russian sentiment that was forming in Japan. That antiRussian attitude amongst Japanese leadership was instigated by the Russian construction
of the Trans-Siberian Railway. While the Russians made claims that the railway would
serve an economic purpose, the Japanese saw it as an inroad for military advancement
into the region. Fukushima “was probably the pioneer in Japan of the ‘intelligence ride’
already widely practiced by Russian and British officers in Asia.”49 Fukushima’s reports
reached as high as Yamagata Aritomo. Fukushima’s reports no longer survive, but
Yamagata’s own personal writings dating from October of 1893 acknowledge the weight
Fukushima’s accounts carried in his strategic thinking.50
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Japanese intelligence has roots that can be traced all the way back to its feudal
period. During that period much of the espionage was carried out by secret societies. This
practice carried on all the way through the Second World War and many of those secret
societies came to make up a significant portion of the informal intelligence network upon
which men like Yamagata relied on. The Japanese recognized these societies as being a
primitive, yet effective, means of sharing information, discovering secrets, and of gaining
leverage on people. The Genyosha, Dark Ocean Society, was founded in 1881. The
society gained enough power that it was actually able to influence Japanese politics.
Genyosha was paramilitary in nature and it possessed a nationalistic objective. In the
words of its members it existed to safeguard the rights of the people. Its real raison d’être
was to gather intelligence on Korea, China, Russia, and Manchuria.51
Yamagata also received information that came from commercial espionage. The
Nisshin Boeki Kenkyujo (Sino-Japanese Commercial Research Office) was one such
example. Ostensibly, its employees engaged in learning Chinese customs, language, and
culture in order to help Japanese companies doing business in China. Among the many
tasks they engaged in was open source intelligence gathering. During the Sino-Japanese
war the Japanese military utilized many of the employees of the Boeki Kenkyujo as scouts
and interpreters. Additionally, the military used them to gather human intelligence. The
Japanese military also began to use them to watch the Korean peninsula. They then
expanded the scope of their operations in the 1890s to include observing Russia and its
movements. The close eye kept on Asian neighbors was due in part to the fact that Japan
now saw China and most of its Asian neighbors as backwards and itself as a great
civilizing force for the region. Japanese leadership viewed both China and Korea as
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puppets of Russia and therefore as hostile nations. Japanese leadership also viewed
Russia’s movement and expansion into China and Manchuria as military endeavors and
not commercial. One of the objects of Japan’s information gathering activities was to
keep track of Russian political developments, troop numbers, and the disposition of both
Chinese and Russian military forces. In many instances Japanese military officers on
study leave with Russian units gathered intelligence on Russia’s military status. In the run
up to the Russo-Japanese conflict the Japanese utilized this tactic extensively. The data
collected by the formal and informal intelligence networks proved valuable in both of the
conflicts Japan fought in at the turn of the twentieth century.52
Since 1868, as a result of the many missions to Europe, including the Iwakura
mission, Japanese military officers had learned about modern European military practices.
On multiple occasions European military commanders tutored the Japanese directly in the
techniques that were they currently employed. Prussian Major Jacob Meckel, for example,
instructed his Japanese army counterparts on the army strategies utilized in the recent
Franco-Prussian War. Japanese naval officers learned from their British peers while on
study leave with Royal Navy units. At the same time British Royal Navy officers were
posted on Imperial Japanese Navy ships and tutored their Eastern counterparts. While
none of these lessons involved intelligence operations that we know of, that does not
mean that the Japanese were not influenced by European examples of intelligence
collection. There is ample evidence that even if the Japanese were not formally educated
in European intelligence techniques, they were observant enough to learn from what was
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going on around them wherever they were posted. The aforementioned intelligence rides
of Fukushima Yasumasa stand as example of this. European expansion throughout Asia
and Africa had established a tradition of intelligence gathering by lone military scouts
and adventurers riding across frontiers. The reports they compiled fed not just the
imagination of those back in their home country, but also supplied their native militaries
with vital information on regions they may one day be invading.53
Europe’s colonial expansion into Africa and Asia had created a practice of using
spies and scouts to gather information on potential enemies. Military scouts often
journeyed deep into frontier lands sending back detailed reports about geography,
inhabitants, cities, and their thoughts on the cultures they encountered. Similarly,
adventure journalists like Archibald Colquhoun and George Ernest Morrison undertook
great expeditions across vast distances of foreign lands. Upon returning home, they wrote
up their experiences for publication. While the public relished reading these exciting
stories, often the true motive behind them was to help compile information for their
government that aided them in conquering these exotic lands. The Japanese learned from
the European example. They had their own adventurers, who like the European
counterparts, secretly amassed information on their neighbors for the state. Japan, though,
was not without its own rich history of espionage to pull from. The Japanese looked
inward as much as they did outward in regards to spying and intelligence gathering. The
Tokugawa Shogunate, for instance, had utilized sophisticated intelligence and spying
operations in order to maintain control over the daimyo and samurai.
During the mid to late 19th century the focal point of much of the Japanese
intelligence gathering effort began to shift from military officers on study leave to the use
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of attachés. The Japanese continued to employ and refine the practice of using attachés
all the way up to the Second World War. Each attaché at an embassy collected and
collated data into reports that were then sent to the associated First Secretary. The
political attaché studied the political atmosphere, kept an ear to the ground at official
functions, and read the local and national papers for political affairs of note. Similarly the
commercial attaché kept abreast of the happenings in the business world. They made
notes on new scientific developments, military contracts, and patents filed for new
technologies. The commercial attaché also kept abreast of stock market activity and
public financial matters. The military attachés spent their time, usually aided by a small
team of specialists, combing through scientific and technical journals. They were looking
for information on arms and ammunition production, advancements that had military
applications, and even banking and shipping information that could reveal the production
capability and capacity of the host nation’s industry. Thus, the embassy served as an
intelligence clearing house. All the intelligence reports for a single region were gathered
at this one place and then the First Secretary would send the information on to the
appropriate ministry in Tokyo.54
During this time the Japanese also began to employ private citizens as intelligence
assets. Japanese intelligence organizations paid private traders like Kishida Ginko to
report back to their IJA handlers on a variety of subjects. Kishida had helped Dr. James
Hepburn on his now famous Japanese dictionary. Together in 1866 they travelled to
Shanghai to have it printed on the modern presses of that city. That first trip was the
beginning of almost thirty years of traveling back and forth between China and Japan.
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While in China, Kishida embarked on numerous business ventures. He became well
versed in the customs and details of several regions. Kishida was a vast source of
information on a country that few Japanese had visited. His final business venture was to
begin publishing pocket editions of Chinese classics designed to be snuck into the
Chinese Civil Service exam by hopeful candidates.55 Kishida also had ties with Genyosha,
one of the informal intelligence networks utilized by the Japanese. It was one of his
bookstores in Shanghai, spawned by the publishing of the pocket editions, which Lt. Arao
Sei arranged to use as the base and cover for his formal intelligence mission in China.
Arao pioneered the integration of the formal and informal intelligence networks that
Japan used through the end of the Second World War. Arao utilized businessmen and
combined their efforts with those individuals who conducted their own intelligence rides
throughout Central Asia. He combined the use of informal intelligence sources with the
formal military intelligence operations of Japan. In his efforts Arao managed to cover the
military, political, and economic spheres of the region. In 1890 Arao, with the help of the
IJA, established a formal government business in China. Located in Shanghai, the
Nisshin Boueki Kenkyo-Jo’s (Institute for Sino-Japanese Trade) outward appearance was
that of a legitimate business endeavor. The stated purpose was to educate Japanese
citizens in the Chinese language and culture in order to facilitate Japanese commercial
expansion into China. Meanwhile, its hidden purpose was the headquarters for Japanese
intelligence operations in China.56
First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)
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The beginnings of Japan’s colonial empire came with the defeat of China in the
First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The war’s genesis had its roots in the continued
concern of the Japanese over the danger the Korean peninsula presented should a foreign
power gain a foothold there. Korea, unable to deal with Western encroachment, found
itself with an isolationist government in the 1880s that was attempting to preserve the
traditional conservative politics and society. The Koreans continued to rely on the
Chinese for protection and guidance on international matters. Unfortunately, the Chinese
were in no position to provide either. Having lost two wars to Britain in 1842 and 1860,
followed by a loss to the French in 1885, the Chinese had proven they were incapable of
resisting Western advances into the East. Finally, by the 1890s the Japanese leadership
realized that possessing Korea would be beneficial for their growing industry as a result
of the extensive coal and iron ore deposits it possessed.
In 1894 hostilities broke out between Qing controlled China and Japan over the
disposition of Korea. It was Japan’s first modern international conflict. It was not only
the Japanese desire to end Chinese suzerainty there, but to also prevent any other powers
such as the Russians, besides themselves, from taking up residence in the aftermath of
accomplishing that goal. Almost as important was the fact that Japanese leadership had
also recognized the economic potential that Korea held. It was rich in both coal and iron
ore deposits, both important in the halcyon days of Japan’s industrial and military buildup.
Korea could also prove to be an agricultural boon and help to feed the growing Japanese
population.57
Traditionally, Korea had been a tributary of the Qing Empire in China. As a not
unexpected result the Chinese regime held significant influence over the Korean officials.
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While the Korean court remained conservative and subservient to the Chinese, the
populace of the country was divided. On one hand there were those who wanted to retain
the relationship with China and on the other were the reformists who wanted to break
from this relationship. In large part the reformists were inspired by the accomplishments
of the Japanese and saw the potential for their own country. As a result Korean reformists
wished to approach Japan and the Western nations it had learned from in order to start
their own journey of advancement. The Japanese were open to meeting with and
promoting the agenda of the reformists for very obvious self-serving reasons. In the mid1880s China was weakened after fighting multiple wars against both the British and the
French and the Japanese saw the opening to supplant Chinese authority in Korea.
Between 1882 and the onset of the war between Japan and China there were a
number of crisis that resulted in escalated tension between the two nations. In 1882 there
was a military uprising. Rioting occurred in Seoul. Food shortages that had occurred due
to drought and that had led to great hardship among the Korean population triggered the
violence. In the midst of the Koreans attacked the Japanese legation. Japan responded by
sending a number of warships and a detachment of soldiers to Seoul in order to protect its
interests. Tensions between the two subsided after an agreement that mandated Korea pay
reparations to Japan. In 1884 there was a failed coup by a group of pro-Japanese
reformers. While they were successful for a time in gaining power, it was not long before
pro-Chinese forces took back the reins in a counter-coup. During the upheaval a number
of Japanese citizens were killed. The result was the Convention of Tientsin which
mandated that neither Japan nor China maintain a military presence in Korea and that
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warning should be given to the other in the event the decision was made to dispatch
troops for any reason. This became a key component in the start of the war in 1894.58
In 1894 the situation in Korea became tense. Korean agents assassinated a proJapanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-kyun, who had been involved in an attempted
coup in 1884. The Korean government had Kim’s body drawn and quartered and then
subsequently displayed as a warning to other revolutionaries. This upset both the
Japanese and the local Korean Kim supporters. At the same time the Korean government
was also dealing with a populist uprising whose adherents demanded reforms aimed at
improving the quality of life for Korea’s destitute. Unable to deal with these matters the
Korean leadership turned to China for military aide. In June the Korean king asked for
help in suppressing the Donghak rebellion. The Qing government responded by sending
troops to aid the Koreans without notifying the Japanese. This caused considerable
apprehension in Tokyo because the Qing government’s actions were in clear violation of
the Convention of Tientsin (1858). Japan’s leaders assembled to decide on a course of
action.59
The violation of the previous Tianjin Treaty, which forbade the deployment of
Chinese forces into the Korean peninsula without first notifying Japan, had the leadership
in Tokyo clamoring for action. The Japanese feared Western interference on the Korean
peninsula because of a weak Korean government that was allied to an ailing China. The
solution was to propose that the Koreans accept Japanese protection and abandon China.
In return, the Japanese would intervene in the current domestic crisis. This was to be
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followed by longer-term intervention with an agenda of progress and reform in the
country. The goal was to make Korea so strong that it would become a suitable barricade
that prevented encroachment into Yamagata’s buffer zone. Japan dispatched an
expeditionary force in late spring of 1894 with these, and other, goals in mind. In early
July the Japanese captured the king and replaced the existing Korean government with a
pro-Japanese body. The new body gave the Japanese the right to expel the Qing forces by
any means necessary. Things began to deteriorate quickly after this. Soon after the British
intervened but all their efforts to mediate a resolution failed. Within a short period the
Japanese took all the necessary steps to expel the Chinese culminating in the first battle
of the war, the Battle of Pungdo on July 25th.60
Prior to the onset of the war estimates of the Chinese military’s strength and
capabilities had placed it well beyond those of its Japanese counterparts. It was not long
before the intelligence apparatus of the IJA allayed any fears that were had concerning
the Chinese military. General Fukushima Yasumasa, the Japanese attaché assigned to
China, utilized the web of formal and informal intelligence systems to report that the
Chinese Army suffered from both political and military weaknesses and that the
symptoms were widespread. Yamagata, who was now a Field Marshall, learned from the
intelligence system that significant levels of corruption plagued the Chinese Army. The
vast intelligence network also illustrated that the figures on the strength of the Chinese
Army were meaningless. Like the pre-Meiji conscript army the Chinese army drew
officers and men from their commander’s home province. Any reinforcements or
replacements also had to come from the same locale and could not be pulled from
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anywhere else. This led to significant issues in training and bred infighting and favoritism.
The loyalty of the various units was also in question.
Corruption was also widespread. While a battalion should have consisted of five
hundred men, Japanese intelligence discovered that many contained as few as three
hundred, or sixty percent of their designed strength. This meant that the Chines army’s
numbers were conflated. This was because many of the commanders kept the enlistment
artificially low so that they could pocket the difference in the pay allotted to a full
battalion by the government. The IJN also participated in pre-war intelligence work. It
obtained valuable information by using private citizens as intelligence assets. Japanese
Admiral Saigo Tsugumichi paid British national J.M. James to report on the daily
activities in the city of Tientsin. Overall, IJN and IJA intelligence efforts elevated the
Japanese confidence going into the conflict about what they could potentially accomplish.
Their intelligence activities not only dispelled any notions of Chinese military superiority,
it had also affirmed that their tactical analysis and planning were accurate.61
The war lasted a scant nine months. Yamagata’s arms buildup in combination
with the information provided by Japan’s intelligence network in China had given Japan
a significant advantage. The lessons learned from the Europeans paid off. The Japanese
forces overwhelmed the Chinese at Pyongyang followed by a decisive naval victory the
day after. In November Port Arthur was taken and then in February of 1895 the Chinese
fleet at Weiheiwei was destroyed. By April of 1895 Itō Hirobumi had negotiated an end
to hostilities. The Treaty of Shimonoseki granted Japan territory in Manchuria to the
Liaodong Peninsula, cession of the Pescadores Islands and Taiwan to Japan, and
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numerous commercial and economic privileges. The concessions granted in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki at the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War ushered Japan into the
world as the first true Eastern colonial power. The Japanese had no intention of stopping.
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)
In many ways the war between Russia and Japan had been inevitable. For over
two hundred years the Russians had crawled across Asia until in the 1860s they reached
the Pacific. Vladivostok, Russia’s newest port at the time, allowed the Russian Navy
access to the Pacific, but its various egresses were well covered by Japan. In addition to
the hindrance presented by Japan, Vladivostok was not an ice free port which was
something the Russians desired. When Russia failed to gain possession of the island of
Tsushima in 1860 as a possible place for a port in the Far East it turned its focus to the
Korean peninsula. A port on the peninsula would allow the Russian fleet to sortie directly
into the Yellow Sea.62
In 1895 Russia had approached and been received by China as an ally against
Japan. The payoff was that Russia had been allowed to construct the Chinese Eastern
Railway across Manchuria. Shortly thereafter, in 1898, China ceded Shantung to the
Germans as recompense for the murder of two of its subjects. Russia capitalized on the
events and secured a lease of the Liaotung Peninsula from China at the same time. The
Japanese sent a military force in to recover their legations and immediately withdrew half
of their force upon the legation’s safe return. Russia again exploited the situation by
sending its garrisons into Manchuria. The Japanese realized that it was only a matter of
time before Russian attempted to push into Korea in order to utilize its warm water ports.
The Japanese had considerable interests in Korea as they owned the Korean rail system
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and tens of thousands of Japanese nationals had settled in Korea. Japan was able to force
Russia’s withdraw through political maneuvering and with the help of its American and
British allies.
In 1902 the Japanese and British signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which
opened the door for Japan to consider military rebuffs of Russian advances into Asia.
While British aid was not automatic in the event of conflict, the alliance formally
recognized that the Japanese had political, commercial, and industrial interests in Korea.
Additionally, the Americans had vowed to side with Japan if a European power should
come to the aid of Russia in the event that hostilities broke out between the Russians and
the Japanese. For a time it appeared that the overwhelming political pressure applied by
the Japanese and their allies was going to carry the day. Unfortunately, it was not to be.63
Japan and its allies forced Russia to agree to withdraw its forces from Manchuria
in three phases. In early 1903 the first of those withdrawals occurred. However, the
second planned step of the withdrawal did not occur as planned. The Tsar ignored the
moderates that were his advisers and instead created a Viceroy of the Russian Far East to
whom he gave the ability to negotiate direct with Japan, China, and Korea. In doing this
he completely cut his foreign minister out of the loop. The Tsar made Admiral Eugene
Alexeiev the Viceroy. Alexeiev was an extremist in Asian matters and believed that
Russian domination of the Asian people was necessary. Furthermore, for Alexeiev and
those that shared his thinking Korea must be Russian.64
In mid-1903, amid mounting concern, the Japanese proposed a settlement with
Russians. The plan offered guaranteed both China’s and Korea’s territorial integrity,
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recognize Russian railway interests in Manchuria, and Japan’s economic and political
investments in Korea. Russia responded by saying it would only guarantee the Korean
stipulations only. This alluded to the fact that Russian had designs on the whole, or at
least a significant portion, of Manchuria. Additionally, Russia requested in its counter
proposal that Japan should eschew fortifying the Korean coast and repudiate interest in
Manchuria. Russia’s rejection of the Japanese terms made war appear inevitable. The
British intervened, acting as mediator, but failed in the attempt. The Japanese re-iterated
their terms in January 1904, but this time they came in the form of an ultimatum.65
The turn of the twentieth century saw nationalism run rampant across the entire
globe. It was also the high tide mark of European racism towards Asia peoples. German
Emperor Wilhelm II often corresponded with his cousin Tsar Nicolas II applauding him
for his stance against the encroaching Asian threat. Wilhelm saw Nicolas as the defender
of not just Europe, but of white Europeans as well. With Wilhelm aggressively
supporting Russian aspirations in the East it was only a matter of time before Russian
intransigence lead to war. It was not long before the Tsar, as well as many Russians,
became uninterested in compromise with the Japanese. The Japanese soon realized as the
talks progressed at the end of 1903 Russia’s stubborn refusal to compromise was a
stalling tactic. The goal was to give the Russian military time to build up before war. The
Japanese, believing that the Russians could not be serious about war, offered one final
ultimatum in January of 1904. The Tsar, emboldened by Wilhelm II’s rhetoric and the
belief that Germany would come to Russia’s aid, ignored it.
The Tsar communicated in February of 1904 to his Viceroy that the Japanese
should be perceived as having started any conflict. The Japanese did not bother to declare
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war formally. On the 8th of February Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian naval
squadron at Port Arthur. On the 9th Admiral Togo Heihachiro’s battleships entered into
action forcing the squadron to withdraw into Port Royal. The formal declaration of war
arrived on February 10th 1904, but the series of one sided naval defeats Russia suffered in
the few days before the declaration were a foreshadowing of what was to come.66
Japan’s strategy for the conflict was to destroy Russia’s navy. By accomplishing
this goal the Japanese would be able to deploy their ground forces freely wherever they
wished, and whenever they liked. The Russians intended to fight a delaying action,
drawing the Japanese deep into Manchuria where they would be confronted far from
resources and re-enforcements. There the Japanese would be defeated at either Harbin or
Liaoyang. Within the first three months of the war the Japanese army had landed in
Korea and advanced across the Yalu. Once they were into Manchuria they faced and
defeated the Russians in battle twice. The second Japanese victory was the costly but
tactically significant capture of Port Royal. The Japanese victory at Port Royal freed the
forces there for important operations at Mukden. Japanese Field-Marshall Oyama Iwao
(1842-1916), the Supreme Japanese Commander in Manchuria, acting quickly gathered
about 250,000 men and began the assault. The Japanese faced approximately 320,000
Russian over a fifty-mile front, but after three weeks of hard fighting and heavy losses on
both sides the Japanese took Mukden. The victory at Mukden was the proverbial nail in
the coffin for the Russians. After its capture the Russians had little chance for victory in
the war.67
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Hoping that her sea power would save the day, Russia refused to surrender. In the
hopes of possibly blockading Japan, the Russian Baltic Fleet sortied on the 16th of
October 1904. Japanese Admiral Togo correctly anticipated that the Russian Fleet would
attempt to pass through the Tsushima strait as a shortcut to Vladivostok. Togo’s scouts
sighted the Russian fleet at 5 am on May 27th. Admiral Togo departed with the Combined
Fleet at 6:34 am and sighted the Russian fleet at 13:40. Within an hour Togo had
executed the difficult tactic of ‘Crossing the T’ not once, but twice.68 By 9:30 on the 28th
of May the Russian Baltic Fleet had been destroyed and what little remained surrendered.
The Japanese losses amounted to around 600 casualties. Three torpedo boats sank. The
Russians suffered far, worse losing seven of their total eleven battleships along with
fifteen other ships constituting cruisers, destroyers, and miscellaneous ships in the fleet.
Out of 18,000 Russian sailors only 6,000 survived the battle. The Japanese victory at the
Battle of Tsushima Strait not only sealed the fate of the Russian navy, but of Russia itself.
In September of 1905, American President Theodore Roosevelt helped to
negotiate peace between the two combatants. On the 5th of September the Treaty of
Potsdam was signed in New Hampshire. All Japan’s interests in Korea were formally
recognized and both countries withdrew from Manchuria simultaneously. Furthermore,
Japan received the Liaotung peninsula, the Russian rail system in the region, and received
Russia’s mining rights as well. Both sides agreed to not exploit the Manchurian railways
for strategic purposes and all of Manchuria was to be returned to China with the
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exception of any leased territories. Maybe just as important as the concessions Japan got
from Russia was the boost to its standing in the world. Overnight the Japanese Navy went
from an unknown to being rated in the top three navies in the world. Just as important
was the fact that the West now believed that Japan’s armies were nothing to be scoffed at.
They drew interesting conclusions. The Japanese had fought with and defeated an
opponent that had a numerical advantage but was also thought to be superior in both
training and breeding. The world was on notice, Japan had arrived.
Japanese Intelligence and the Russo-Japanese War
The Iwakura mission, along with the other diplomatic expeditions of the late
nineteenth century, was more than just an information gathering endeavor. The Japanese
also gathered intelligence on their potential European opponents. Germany, Britain, and
British India were of particular interest. But none held the Japanese attention as closely as
Russia did. From about 1890 forward the Japanese envisioned the Russians as the
primary opponent of the Japanese military. Japan not only kept close tabs on Russia itself,
but also upon the proceedings that it took part in Asia. Russia was known to be active in
China, Manchuria, Korea, and Siberia. In fact the Japanese viewed both China and Korea
as puppet states that the Russians influenced and regarded them as being hostile to
Japanese interests. As a result, they received the same level of scrutiny that Russia proper
did. By the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese intelligence apparatus was
much larger, more efficient, and no longer of an ad-hoc nature like it had been for the
earlier Sino-Japanese conflict. The result was that intelligence efforts for the RussoJapanese War were both more complex and more numerous. Of particular interest to the
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now extensively developed Japanese intelligence during the waning years of the
nineteenth century was the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia involvement with it.69
The Trans-Siberian Railway was constructed under the direct supervision of the
Russian government between the years of 1891 and 1916. The intention was, officially, to
create an efficient and speedy transportation route between Europe and Asia. Despite the
large amount of commercial traffic the line serviced, being filled to capacity almost
immediately, the Japanese leadership saw the line instead as a potential military artery.
Japanese leadership viewed the line, in combination with the Chinese Eastern Railway, as
a way for Russia to intrude on Japan’s regional concerns.70 It even potentially placed the
Russians in the position to invade the Japanese Islands themselves. Thus, the focus of
Japanese intelligence was to monitor developments along and surrounding the line. The
construction and use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad became part of the casus belli for the
Russo-Japanese War. In the mind of Yamagata, the railroad was a long-term threat. It
gave the Russians access to Korea and its warm water harbors. The Russians, Yamagata
concluded, would be tempted to obtain access and use those ports anyway they could.
Ultimately, with Russians on the Korean peninsula the very of safety of Japan was at
stake. Therefore, Yamagata and the Japanese decision makers were highly interested in
the ability of the line to transport troops and military supplies from Europe to the East.71
During the period after the First Sino-Japanese War and going into the RussoJapanese War, the Japanese intelligence system used military attachés agents of
69

Ian Nish, “Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo-Japanese War,” 17-18.
The Chinese Eastern Railway was constructed between 1897 and 1902 by Imperial Russia via a
concession issued from Qing China. The line was roughly shaped like the letter ‘T’ and contained three
branches. The Harbin-Manzhouli or Western Branch, the Harbin-Suifenhe or Eastern Branch, and the
Beijing-Harbin or Southern Branch.
71
Ian Nish, “Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo-Japanese War,” 18; James L. McClain,
Japan: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), 292.
70

56

espionage. Prior to that and starting with the Meiji Restoration the practice of sending
military officers abroad for training had become routine. Referred to as ryugakusei,
overseas student, some of the first of these military officers arrived in Russia in the late
1890s. Often, connected with the attaché office were groups of language officers whose
duties also included acting as intelligence officers. The activities of the military attachés
may or may not have been fully known to the diplomats who were also expected to carry
out intelligence functions themselves. Even the lower level consuls, as was illustrated
earlier with the story of Yoshikawa Takeo, provided reports inter alia on the military
goings on in the city of their posting. By the 1890s Japanese intelligence operations
exhibited the features that would make them successful during the first years of World
War II. Diplomats, for instance, created spy networks out of local recruits who were paid
from diplomatic funds. Intelligence gathering had long term goals in mind. Prior to the
Battle of Malaya the Japanese utilized both of these techniques.72
General Baron Fukushima Yasumasa was one of the early intelligence figures
with a foreign posting who figured greatly in the future conflict with Russia. First posted
to China in 1878 as a military attaché, he helped to pioneer the Japanese intelligence ride
when he took a solo trip into India. In 1892 he spent 15 months on another such trip
crossing Siberia. His reports on the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the
organization of the Russian Army, and the apparent weakness of the Qing government all
carried immense weight with Yamagata Aritomo. It was primarily because of these
reports and the suspicion they cast on Russian intentions in the East that Yamagata
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successfully argued for the buildup of the Japanese army and navy that occurred over the
next decade.
In 1898 both the Japanese army and navy sent their own respective officers to
Russia as ryugakusei. Hirose Takeo (1868-1904), a graduate of Tokyo Naval College,
was posted under the naval attaché to the Japanese legation in St. Petersburg. He served
in that position for five years. Meanwhile, Captain Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929), a
graduate of the military academy, was assigned to the military attaché to the Japanese
legation in St. Petersburg. Tanaka was instructed to pay particular attention to the
condition of the Russian army, its operations, ability to mobilize, education, and the
general condition of Russia. Both men were to pay close attention to the interconnection
between the military and the people. The Japanese goal was to have both Hirose and
Tanaka attached directly to Russian units during their time in the country. The posting of
two Japanese officers to active Russian units had never been achieved before. Both men
enveloped themselves in the language, culture, and customs of the country in an effort to
achieve this objective.73
In March of 1900 Captain Tanaka Giichi requested posting to a Russian unit.
Tanaka’s Russian language skills had become more than adequate and he had gone so far
as to profess belief in the Orthodox faith.74 In June of that same year his request was
approved. During his time with the Russian unit, Tanaka carefully recorded the details of
his time in the barracks and on maneuvers. More importantly he observed the social
unrest that was present in Russia. Because of strikes organized by the revolutionary
movement, Tanaka detected the beginning deterioration of Russian stability. He also
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noted the movement for Polish independence in his work. Both things he believed could
be exploited to the advantage of the Japanese in the event of war. To those ends he set
about attending functions in Warsaw and building up connections amongst these various
movements. He was careful, though, not stir up sedition.75
In 1902 Tanaka was recalled to Japan. His superiors ordered him to persist for a
time in both Manchuria and Siberia on his return for intelligence purposes. He left St.
Petersburg in April and travelled to Harbin via the Siberian railway first and then the
Chinese Eastern Railway. From Harbin he made an excursion by river to Vladivostok and
then returned. He proceeded to take the Chinese Eastern railway again to Port Arthur
whence he departed for Nagasaki. Upon his arrival in Tokyo of June of that same year
Tanaka had completed over two months of reconnaissance throughout Russia. The
evidence that Tanaka provided on the railways’ capacity to carry troops and supplies, its
developmental progress, and Russian motives within the regions visited proved vital to
Japanese strategic planning against Russia. As a result of his time and experiences in
Russia he was promoted to head of the Russian section in 1903 and became responsible
for operational planning against Russia. The intelligence gathering that Japan engaged in
was not uncommon in the West or the East, as can be seen in this example. Intelligence
excursions like this continued to play an important role through the Second World War.
The Japanese often debriefed diplomats, heads of state, businessmen, and average
citizens upon their return to the nation. The Japanese clearly developed an intelligence
apparatus along the same lines and at roughly the same pace as their Western
counterparts.
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Aside from information gathering, Japan also attempted to foment rebellion prior
to and during the war with Russia. The Finnish and Polish populations were both
susceptible to such efforts, as were weak points in Russia itself. Both had suffered
persecution at the hands of the Tsarist government and both were sick of its perceived
tyranny. In Finland, for example, a group of individuals who applauded Japan’s progress
socially and economically opposed Tsarist rule. They saw in Japan a potential ally in
escaping Tsarist tyranny. In 1904 they created a stir when they assassinated a provincial
governor. The Japanese viewed them as a tool with which they could subvert the Tsar. In
doing this they forced the Russian military to commit troops to a pacification effort.
Those directly involved with the assassination were chiefly urban in nature. The Japanese
military saw the benefit in exploiting resentment of the Russians and the potential
undermining of their war effort. In Poland could be found the foundations of the labor
movement and other anti-Tsarist groups which spread throughout Russia in the late
nineteenth century challenging Tsarist rule. Individuals like Józef Pilsudski who resented
the russification of their homeland held a deep seated distaste for not only the Tsar but for
the Russian rule of Poland in general. These parties were all weapons against the
Russians in the eyes of the Japanese. They were used to disrupt the Russian war effort
and, in theory, were supposed to tie up the crack units of the Russian military.76
Colonel Akashi Motojiro (1864-1919), Tanaka’s successor, became aware of the
dissent present in both these regions. With the goal of finding a way to cajole Russia into
keeping her top troops in Europe, Akashi set about aiding Russian revolutionaries, buying
Russian agents, and disrupting Russian war efforts through the support of internal discord.
Japanese intelligence not only used Finland and Poland, Pilsudski traveled to Tokyo at
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the onset of the Russo-Japanese War to try to acquire Japanese assistance for a Polish
uprising, to try and disrupt the Russian war effort, but it also attempted to use other antiTsarist groups found along the Russian borders and in Europe. Akashi ended up
distributing approximately one million yen to these various groups in attempting to
complete his mission of subversion.77
While the Japanese subversion campaign during the Russo-Japanese war appears
to have been enormous, the question of its effectiveness remains. While it is true that the
Russians did not send their crack troops to face Japan at the onset of hostilities, the
question of whether the decision was a result of unpreparedness, the surprise and
swiftness of the Japanese attack, or Russia’s – and the West’s – propensity to
underestimate the East’s abilities still remains. No direct correlation between Japanese
activities and Russian troop deployment exists. In no way, though, does this detract from
the efforts and achievements of Japanese intelligence. It was also during this time that the
Japanese began intercepting communications between the Chinese diplomats in Japan
and their government. While the Japanese had been able to crack Chinese cryptology
there is no surviving evidence that they had been able to crack European codes. On the
other hand, European powers had cracked the Japanese codes and were feeding
information to Russia.78
As it is with all assessments of intelligence work, it is almost impossible to arrive
at an overarching estimate of Japanese intelligence effectiveness during the war. The
Japanese had both successes and failures. Japan was successful in obtaining actionable
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intelligence through capable field officers. It was able to create concern about both Polish
and Finnish resistance in Russian authorities. When Japan openly declared war, it created
a general headquarters for intelligence gathering that lasted the duration of the conflict.
As a result, Japan was able to offset for its lack of manpower and resources with the
careful application of intelligence. In the end, the decision to go to war with Russia was a
calculated risk based on information gained through its intelligence operations. Despite
all of this and the resounding Japanese victory that made the Western world take note,
several operational weaknesses were exposed that would feature down the road all the
way to the Second World War.
For starters, Japanese cryptanalytic activities demonstrated their second-rate
nature to their European counterparts. This problem would persist through their defeat at
the end of 1945. For many, the Japanese had numerous small or short-lived triumphs, but
never achieve the type of long-term successes that the West continually appeared to
have.79 Another major weakness that became apparent during the Russo-Japanese War
was the lack of co-operation between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial
Japanese Navy. Each ran their own intelligence arm and each acted, for the most part,
independently of the other. Very little documentation survives on the IJN side, but what
little there is seems to corroborate this. The relationship between the two continued to be
strained all the way down to defeat in 1945. The other large pitfall of Japanese
intelligence appears to be that it became dependent on personalized intelligence gathering
79
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coming from almost larger than life characters like Tanaka and Akashi. This view may be
a result of the lack of information left after the great purges of the Second World War.80
Almost no information exists on the level of organization in Tokyo during this time, or
after, and what has survived tends to be of a biographical nature. This has led historians
to a character driven narrative versus a factual cause and effect analysis of events as they
occurred.81
What Japanese intelligence activities during this period reveal to historians is that
they were not on a course of development dissimilar to their European counterparts. This
was due in no large part to their extensive missions to the West where they interacted
with, learned from, and observed the practices of European powers. While the Japanese
may have lacked in certain areas they were just as accomplished as their Western
counterparts in many of the other facets of intelligence gathering. The Japanese utilized
the same Intelligence Cycle and the same collection disciplines as the West. It also
reveals that the intelligence rivalry among services prevented the long-term creation of a
governing central intelligence authority. This is something that the Western powers also
suffered from. America itself did not attempt to solve this issue until the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the onset of the Cold War, and arguably still has not
fully achieved the intended result.
Outcomes
Its military victories over first China and then Russia in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries respectively, signaled it arrival as a top world military power.
These events helped to start Japan down the path to colonial expansion.
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By the start of the First World War Japan had gained Taiwan in the Treaty of
Shiminoseki, which ended the First Sino-Japanese War, and Korea as a protectorate, first
through the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 and then fully annexing it in 1910. Japan seized
upon the opportunity to expand its sphere of influence following the outbreak of WWI.
The Empire of Japan declared war on the German Empire and quickly seized the German
colonial holdings in the Pacific. Japan’s new territories were the Marshall Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The Treaty of Versailles officially
recognized the Japanese seizure of these islands and the Japanese created the position of
Governor of the South Pacific Mandate to oversee them.
The islands of the South Pacific Mandate were of vital strategic import because
they enabled the Japanese to dominate the Pacific sea-lanes militarily. Additionally, they
provided advantages in terms of their positioning for the refueling and provisioning of
ships. The Japanese viewed these islands as, in modern terminology, unsinkable aircraft
carriers.82 The Japanese built them up militarily and used them first for their initial
conquests of the Pacific starting in 1931 and ultimately to defend against incursion by the
United States. The Japanese officially started the Pacific War with their invasion of
Manchuria in 1931 following the Mukden Incident, otherwise known as the Manchurian
Incident. The islands of the South Pacific Mandate became the sites for the both the
offensive and defensive operations of the Japanese Navy and Army in the Pacific after
the December 1941 offensive thrust into the Pacific.
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Most importantly Japanese military intelligence had shown that it was equivalent in
almost all respects to that of its Western counterparts. Japanese intelligence systems had
played important roles in both Japanese victories at the turn of the twentieth century. A
thorough analysis of Japanese intelligence has a basis in the late nineteenth century when
they were absorbing, implementing, and improving on the practices they had observed
while studying in the West. Japan’s intelligence methods were connected to the training
of its military officers abroad. This meant that Japan’s military branches were developing
their intelligence capabilities at roughly the same time as their Western counterparts. In
1893 the Navy General Staff took over operational authority of the IJN and its third
department, or section depending on translation, was dedicated to intelligence gathering.
The Imperial Japanese Army, under Yamagata Aritomo, fully adopted the Prussian
General Staff system in 1878. Under this organization the second department, or section,
was dedicated to intelligence operations. For comparison, the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) is the oldest existing intelligence service in the United States founded
in 1882. Likewise, the US Army counterpart, the Military Intelligence Division (MID),
was founded in 1885. Meanwhile Britain’s Secret Service Bureau, the predecessor to MI6,
was formed in 1909 and the British Royal Navy formed the Naval Intelligence
Department (NID) in 1887.
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Chapter 3
British Malaya
British Malaya is the term used to describe the states of the Malaya peninsula that
Britain brought under its colonial umbrella in the late eighteenth century. The Malayan
peninsula lies on a vital sea-lane for trade and travel. The first Europeans to establish
themselves in the region were the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, followed by the
Dutch in the seventeenth century. English traders had been present in the Malayan region
since the seventeenth century. Prior to the nineteenth century, the British interests in the
region had been of an economic nature. Having already colonized India, they began to
look for new territories to strengthen their colonial empire in terms of raw resources. As
time progressed, the British were able to establish a series of free ports in the region in an
attempt to break up the monopoly held on the region by other European powers.
Eventually, these ports allowed Britain to control the majority of the trade through the
region. In the nineteenth century, fearing Siamese expansion, the rulers of Malaya
aligned themselves with Britain thereby increasing its power in the region.
It was the British that eventually established their sovereignty over the Malayan states
with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. That treaty delineated the boundaries between the
Dutch East Indies and the territories that became British Malaya.83 Becoming a British
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Colony introduced the Malayan region to yet another round of foreign influence as the
British imported Indian workers and eventually Indian soldiers into the region in order to
meet the demands of the colonial economy and defend the colony.
While British policy was decidedly non-interventionist to start with, the mining of
resources valuable to the Empire led to infighting among the Malay states. Initially, this
conflict revolved around the production of tin. The resulting destabilization led to British
intervention. The British employed gunboat diplomacy to pacify the region and bring it
back into line with the Empire. In 1874 the British and the Sultan of Perak signed the
Treaty of Pangkor. The treaty opened the door for increased British influence and
legitimized their presence in the region. As a result, the British placed advisors with the
Malay states and eventually ruled in all but name.
British fully established rule by the early twentieth century. The populations of
the region, now known as British Malaya, were subjects of the crown. As with other
colonies, the British viewed Malaya as primarily an economic possession. Initially, its
main attractions were its tin and gold mines. Eventually, British entrepreneurs
experimented with a variety of cash crops that included coffee and pepper. In the late
nineteenth century, rubber was added to the list of valuable exports and with the rapid
growth of technology it soon became the leading earner for the region. By the 1930s,
some fifty years after the introduction of rubber, the international trade that ran through
Malaya and Singapore was significant.
1926 was the peak year for British Malaya in terms of trade. Malaya by itself
eclipsed all other British colonies combined in terms of value. It decreased after that due
to falling prices that were the result of the worldwide economic downturn of the 1930s.
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Yet, in 1938 Malayan trade still eclipsed that of all the British African colonies, or of
New Zealand. By that time Malaya was producing half of the world’s rubber, one third
of its tin, and it had substantial iron ore deposits. It is no wonder that Japan looked at
Malaya with intent. Not only did it harbor vital resources that Japan needed for its own
economic and military advancement, it also provided a gateway to the Dutch East Indies
and their bountiful oil fields. Then there was Singapore, a thriving port lying on a
valuable trade and travel route. Malaya was rich with raw materials that Japan needed to
feed its war machine and economy. It was inevitable that the Japanese would look to take
these colonies from the British and other European powers for its own.84
Pre-World War II Malaya
Japan had begun the process of organizing an espionage ring in Malaya during the
First World War. During that conflict Britain granted Japan, then an ally, the use of naval
facilities in the port of Penang. At that point in it its history Japanese intelligence services
possessed nearly twenty years of successful operations experience. Utilizing Japanese
agents and foreign assets, the intelligence agencies proved instrumental in the decision to
go to war with China, the First Sino-Japanese War, and later in the Japanese victory over
Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. It was not long before they put the skills and
tactics they had honed in the previous quarter century to work in Malaya. By 1905 the
Japanese had operatives in the northern and Southern regions of the China Seas. Once the
Japanese established a covert presence in Malaya it was a relatively easy task for them to
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link up with their sister networks in places like Thailand and Burma. This led to the
creation of a loose, but large, web of intelligence that spread across the entire region.85
Starting in the 1870s and continuing through the late 1930s the Japanese
population on the Malayan peninsula increased from a mere handful of individuals to
over six thousand people. During this period the nature and makeup of this population
had evolved considerably. The population evolved from a predominantly female base to
male and professionally from prostitution to entrepreneurial in nature. The period
between the two world wars saw some of the most explosive growth in the Japanese
population and these changes were the reflection of the growing Japanese Imperial drive.
The need for more raw materials, outlets for manufactured goods, and territory led to
emigration and economic enterprise throughout the region. Japanese ambition in East
Asia was driven in part by the desire to be viewed as an equal of its Western counterparts.
This drove the Japanese to exert a greater effort to achieve their goals.86
In the late 1930s the British became increasingly alarmed about the number and
activities of the Japanese nationals living in its Southeast Asian possessions. A significant
portion of the British authorities’ attention focused on actions classified within the
category of espionage. The British anxiety was not unfounded. There was an extensive
pre-war espionage network in Malaya controlled primarily by the Japanese. They did
have some fringe help from their future allies Italy and Germany. Regrettably, the
majority of the Japanese populace’s actions that were of interest to the British in these
cases have failed to receive much, if any, scholarly attention. The narrative on the
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security of Malaya and the Singapore naval base is incomplete until this aspect is added
to the other facets currently being studied. The information that we do have about
Japanese assets placed at the community level and within the commercial environment
show historians that the Japanese possessed a dedicated and capable intelligence
gathering force.87
The inter-war period is notable for being a time during which a lack of attention
and funding compromised the British Far East strategy. Despite an analysis by MajorGeneral William Dobbie that predicted when and where major landings could, and would,
occur in the event of an invasion, the British government took no remedial action. In lieu
of sending a large number of reinforcements to the region the British decided that a
proper defense was possible by using a large naval force stationed at the Singapore Naval
Base. By 1940 military planners grudgingly admitted that to defend Singapore alone the
British needed more than just a strong fleet presence. They also needed a significant air
force, numbering upwards of 500 aircraft, and ground forces in addition to the naval units
in order to secure the entire peninsula. Unfortunately for the British it was a matter of too
little too late. By the time they realized their folly, priorities in other regions of the world
and at home prevented them from sending the required forces for a successful defense of
Malaya.
The oral histories and memoirs from British expatriates and Malayan nationals
during the inter-war period recount a lively Japanese citizenry that was involved in all
aspects of life. In almost every town, village, and community there resided a Japanese
population that was participating in a variety of trades. Local Japanese populations
engaged in trades like barbers, shopkeepers, photographers, and fishermen. As tensions
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between East and West increased, the seemingly omnipresent Japanese soon evolved into
the ever present and ever watching Japanese spy, for both their contemporaries and later
historians. Despite being over exaggerated there was a significant element of truth
underlying these suspicions. The Japanese intelligence organizations were financially
backing much of the subversion that existed in Malaya and it was not confined to just
those individuals of Japanese heritage. It also included Indians and Malayans who were
unhappy with British colonial rule. British authorities, sensitive to potential diplomatic
backlash from a nation that was still nominally friendly and desiring to avoid creating
unrest in the East, resorted to deporting only those Japanese suspected of espionage who
they had enough information on to warrant such action.88
The British were in a pickle. Despite the mounting evidence that pointed to a
complex and massive espionage campaign in Malaya they were still very careful not to
take any action that may have provoked or offended the Japanese. The British had
enough on their plate in the West, the last thing they wanted to do was precipitate
violence in the East. This was further complicated by the fact that through the mid-1930s
up to 1940 the Japanese government was going out of its way to look for provocation,
especially in the diplomatic realm. Adding to the strain for the British was the growing
concern over developments in Europe. British leadership was well aware that they could
ill afford a war on two fronts. Europe was the, closer, more pressing concern. This
resulted in a non-confrontational policy in the East. They still needed to find some way to
curtail Japanese intelligence activities. Thus, the British resorted to deportation in cases
involving the Japanese that warranted action. Even in those instances the decision to act
88
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needed sanctioned first by the Foreign Office and then by the Colonial Office, both
located in London. As can be expected this led to inter-ministry headaches for the British
and an exploitable weakness for the Japanese.89
Commercial and Diplomatic Intelligence
The Japanese web of espionage in Malaya focused more heavily on the collection
of commercial intelligence. In the pre-war period the majority of the agents that
comprised this web were individuals of a Japanese nationality, many of whom were
ostensibly there on commercial business. Most of these people were what the Intelligence
Community today refers to as an asset. The Japanese government did not directly employ
them per se, instead they were tasked with collecting intelligence that they came into
contact with through the course of their normal business dealings and day to day life.
This is not to say that there were not a considerable number of agents whose spying was
the main reason that they were there. As assets of the Japanese intelligence apparatus,
they only took part in the collections step of the Intelligence Cycle. They were not privy
to, nor did they need to be, the larger planning and direction of operations. This was as
much for their own safety as it was for the security of whatever operation they were
providing data for. In today’s parlance this is referred to as compartmentalization.90
Thanks to Japanese imperial ambition, not only had the Japanese presence
multiplied in regards to population in Malaya, but also in respect to the number of
commercial endeavors that they had. They owned tin mines in the east and in the south in
and around Johore, rubber estates along major routes of travel that allowed them to
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monitor Commonwealth troop movements, and a massive fishing fleet that operated out
of Singapore and travelled up and down the entire coast. During their fishing voyages the
skippers of the individual vessels had ample opportunities to survey various ports, the
coastline, and traffic on the seas. A favorite tactic of the Japanese intelligence
organizations was the infiltration of the small business professional, and the result is the
ubiquitous image of the dentist who was a spy that has been passed down to us by history.
In practically every town there was a Japanese storekeeper, barber, or dentist. In many
instances they set up their practices and businesses near, or even next to, the local British
garrison. This made it easy to monitor activity and in the course of doing business pick
up the random bits of information that were spilled through uncaring lips.91
In a situation not that much different than today, the vast majority of Japanese
enterprises that were located throughout the rest of the world, not just Malaya, were
engaged in some kind of espionage.92 Many of the businesses were not only members of
government sponsored trade organizations but had also received substantial funds or
subsidization from the Japanese government. In many instances the entire reason for the
existence of a firm was to conduct intelligence gathering for the government and partake
in subversive activities. This was multiplied by the devotion that Japanese citizens had
for their land and emperor. The fidelity of Japanese nationals to their home was strong
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enough of a motivating factor that both employees of corporations and regular Japanese
citizens would engage in espionage without question when called upon.
Two prime examples of firms whose raison d’être was spying were the Nippon
Trade Agency and the South Manchurian Railway (SMR). The “Nippon Trade Agency,
which was almost certainly a section of the Army Special Service Section,” had branches
all over the world that included cities and countries such as Singapore, Bangkok, and
China.93 In China it was even known as the ‘Japanese Detective Bureau’. The SMR
eventually gave “birth to the Economic Research and Investigation Bureau.”94 The SMR
also had close ties with the Japanese Army in Manchuria and actively engaged in
espionage on its own. Several SMR’s officials, when detained and searched in Singapore,
were found to be holding detailed documents on the rail systems of several neighboring
countries. Among the nations they had information on were Thailand and the Netherlands
East Indies (NEI). NEI possessed rich oil deposits and as a result was of particular
interest to the Japanese. These documents included a confidential book, of which there
were only a few restricted copies in existence, which went into comprehensive detail on
the Malayan railways.95
Colonel Tsugunori Kadomatsu’s story is one good example of the ability of
Japanese agents to insert themselves into positions of opportunity in Malaya. Tsugunori
had been working for Japanese Naval Intelligence since 1930. Employed under the alias
Shawan, he worked in Singapore for approximately six years as a steward in the British
Officers’ Club. Owing to lax security within the club, Tsugunori passed on information
about the daily routines of crews, issues within the fleet, along with the comings, goings,
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and potential destinations of the various British and commonwealth ships stationed or
visiting Singapore. The British discovered Tsugunori in 1941 when a visitor noticed his
unusual interest in the officers’ discussions. The British devised a rather simple ruse to
catch the spy. The next time that he was working an officer would mention, in a
noticeable manner, that the warship Prince of Wales was due in port soon. Meanwhile
another British agent would observe the actions of the, hopefully, unsuspecting
Tsugunori. When the scene played out the British agents observed Tsugunori hastily
scribbling something on a napkin that he was holding. Once detained and the napkin
confiscated it read ‘PW end of November’ and the British promptly arrested him.96
Diplomatic intelligence was, and still is, an incredibly efficient and effective way
of gaining information about one’s opponent. The Japanese used their embassies and
consulates more extensively for covert affairs than most other countries at the time did.
As had been the practice for almost seventy years, Japanese consulates and embassies
directed intelligence activities within to which they were accredited. They actively
executed the collection, processing and exploitation, and analysis steps of the intelligence
cycle. In some cases, to varying degrees, they also partook in the planning and direction
step. Staff, whose primary mission was the gathering of intelligence, filled these locations.
Ambassadors, consular officials, and attachés collected information on any matter that
could be of use or was of interest to their or other departments. From their official offices,
they managed the covert operations of the various Japanese associations and commercial
firms. They also facilitated the meetings between subversives and nationalists with their
own government officials. They took advantage of their diplomatic privileges, as many
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nations still do today, in the organization and facilitation of these operations. They even
functioned as clearing houses for all of the intelligence that was collected, passing it
along in protected diplomatic pouches or transmitting it direct to Tokyo via their own
wireless systems. Once the intelligence arrived at the appropriate department in Tokyo, it
was analyzed and the final product was disseminated to the proper parties for use.
The Shinozaki Case
One of the more famous cases of pre-war diplomatic espionage was that of
Shinozaki Mamoru (1908-1991). The declassification of British records in the years after
the war combined with the release of an autobiography in the early 1970s now permit a
deeper analysis of the events surrounding this man. In the fall of 1940 Shinozaki was a
press attaché stationed in Singapore at the Japanese Consulate-General. His position as a
journalist, a non-official cover or NOC, provided the cover for his activities as a spy for
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.97 In September of 1940 Shinozaki was arrested
on charges of espionage after obtaining intelligence of a military nature from a British
serviceman.
As had been practice since the early days of the Meiji Restoration, Japan had been
sending consuls to Singapore since the late 1880s. British authorities had come to suspect,
and rightly so, that the staff of these consuls were engaged in activities beyond the scope
of the normal consular duties, activities of a clandestine nature. British suspicions were
compounded by their inability to distinguish clearly between Japanese government
employees and those who employed by Japanese-run organizations. The matter was
complicated owing to the fact that many Japanese firms were part of government funded
97
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trade organizations or had received substantial government financial backing. Shinozaki,
though, had carried a letter of appointment expressly naming him as a member of the
consulate staff when he arrived in 1938.98
Special Branch of the British colonial police in Malaya had long deemed the
Japanese Consulate-General in Singapore as the primary conduit through which
intelligence flowed to Tokyo. While this was not, nor is it still, an unusual practice, it did
present the British with a very specific and delicate set of problems. First and foremost,
the Japanese and British, ostensibly, were friendly. Any action the British took to curb
and counter the intelligence activities of the Japanese had to be carefully calculated for
political reasons. Second, once any information had been placed inside of a diplomatic
bag and properly marked the British had little recourse for search or seizure even if they
had enough evidence to do so. If the intelligence did not go out via diplomatic courier
then operatives smuggled it out aboard ships, by agents across the border to Thailand, or
radioed to passing sea traffic. The suspicions of the Special Branch proved to be very
astute after the start of the war in December of 1941.99
Upon his arrival in Singapore Shinozaki began to fraternize with British service
members who posted there, often times inviting them out to raucous parties. It was these
parties, in combination with his posting at the consulate, which caught the attention of the
British Special Branch. It was not long before Shinozaki’s movements were being
watched with regularity. After agents of Special Branch observed him meeting multiple
times with Frank Gardner, the British service member in question, they ordered
Shinozaki to report to Special Branch headquarters. Gardner was detained at a later time
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for questioning. Prior to his being called in by the British Special Branch, British agents
observed Shinozaki meeting with visiting mid-level Japanese Army officers and escorting
them around Singapore. These interactions only served to confirm Special Branch’s
suspicions about him. The British arrested Shinozaki promptly upon his arrival at Special
Branch headquarters.
Special branch detectives took Shinozaki to the Consulate-General in order to
search his room. The Consular-General Toyoda Kaoru who had been proclaiming
Shinozaki’s innocence also accompanied them. When they arrived Shinozaki bolted for
his residence. Upon entering his quarters he attempted to dispose of a letter by throwing it
quickly to the Consular-General’s secretary. While the detectives searched the room
another consular official attempted to burn and flush another document down the toilet.
In total, the British recovered the first letter, several reports, a notepad, and the partially
burned document. Toyoda remained present during the entire search in an attempt to
prevent the British from opening and searching the official consular safe.
After a short trial Shinozaki was found guilty of collecting information on and
about the Royal Artillery and for collecting information on the movements and
deployments of British troops, both for “… a purpose prejudicial to the interests of the
British Empire ….”100 During the trial it came to light that Shinozaki had paid Gardner
undisclosed sums of money. The conclusion was that those payments had been for
information detailing British military troop movements and disposition. Shinozaki denied
that he had ever had conversations with any British service members on such topics other
than what came up in passing. He claimed he had never deliberately sought the
information out. He also contended that the money he had given to Gardner had been
100
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merely “out of sympathy.”101 The question had been, and to some extent still is, what
exactly did Shinozaki do and was he successful in any attempts he made to gather
information on British forces.102
In post-war interviews, Shinozaki reversed his post-trial stance. He admitted to
attempting contact with British Royal Artillery servicemen. His goal had been to
ascertain the positions of the heavy British guns. Authorities in Singapore at the time of
his arrest had also determined that he had attempted to learn from Gardner information
regarding British troop movements, positions, coastal defenses, unit strengths, and the
location of ammunition dumps. While his success at gaining this information appears to
have been mediocre, his acting as a guide for Japanese military experts was significant. In
September of 1940 Shinozaki guided Army General Staff planning officer Lieutenant
Tanigawa Kazuo and his assistant Kunitake Teruhito around the Southern portion of the
Malayan peninsula. Their observations were included in a report published in 1941 titled
“Intelligence Report of British Malaya” and included detailed cartographic information
on the region stretching from the Malay peninsula all the way to Singapore. Kunitake
later became a staff officer in the 25th Army. That unit successfully attacked the very
areas Shinozaki had guided him to for surveillance.103
Despite British efforts to keep things quiet when dealing with Japanese agents, a
few cases like the Shinozaki case did become public. Those that did served only to reenforce the fears of the populace that Japanese spies could be lurking anywhere. British
authorities attempted to counter the Japanese intelligence activities but lacked any real
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counter-intelligence strategy. They began to prohibit foreigners or “aliens” from certain
areas and to declare others off limits to foreigners. The police created a special Nippon
(Japan) section that dealt exclusively with the comings, goings, and activities of Japanese
nationals. Despite British counter intelligence efforts, diplomatic concerns prevented
their endeavors from being effective. More importantly, the cases that are known about
are direct evidence that the Japanese were continuing to use attachés, businessmen, local
shop owners, and even the disenfranchised native populace as operatives to great effect.
They are proof that the Japanese continued to operate a highly developed espionage
operation that consisted of both formal and informal collections activities. They had
employed these same tactics with great effect since before the First Sino-Japanese War
and they were some of the same strategies that the West was employing. The result of
this intelligence effort would eventually be a total victory over British Commonwealth
Forces in 1941.104
Japanese Naval Intelligence
While we have spoken about diplomatic and commercial intelligence, let us turn
to the subject of naval intelligence. The Japanese created the The Kaigun Tokumu Bu,
Naval Special Service Organization, in the early 1930s in China. Its origination lies with
a group of naval attachés located at various ports. The Naval Special Service
Organization performed many of the same functions of its army counterpart and was
supposed to cooperate with them closely. However, the Naval Special Services never
achieved the power or importance of its army equivalent and there is evidence that the
navy units engaged in infighting and petty disputes with the army units. There are even
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reports that illustrate how naval representatives reported on their army opposites to their
superiors in Tokyo.105
Possibly some of the most significant work that the Kaigun Tokumu did was in the
South China Sea around Malaya. The intelligence effort undertaken by the navy agents
aboard Japanese fishing vessels helped to map coastlines, conduct hydrographic surveys,
reported on naval traffic, and scout naval bases and ports. The Japanese fishing fleets
were by far the largest in the region and they roamed far and wide collecting intelligence.
The issue became so severe, and so widely known, around Singapore and the coasts of
Malaya that the government decided to limit the annual number of fishing licenses the
Japanese could have. They also instituted a system of inspection to help combat the
issues on those vessels that were granted a license. While the issues surrounding Malaya
and Singapore are perhaps the best known, it is highly likely that the Japanese navy
repeated the use of this tactic in other areas as well.106
Like other land based commercial interests, the fishing fleets of Japan were often
highly subsidized by the government, if not directly then most assuredly through bank
loans that were guaranteed by the government. Many of the officers in the fishing fleets
were naval officers. Their actions often gave them away to British Special Branch. Often
times they became exceedingly obdurate when the British boarded their vessel. In one
instance, the crew of the largest fishing vessel to visit Singapore, the Shinkyo Maru, acted
in such a professional manner that Special Branch suspected the entire crew of being, at
the very least, naval reservists and the ship of being a spy ship. Furthermore, the British
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discovered that the vessel itself carried both a medium-wave and short-wave transmitter.
The latter of which had a range of almost ten thousand miles under the ideal atmospheric
conditions enabling the Japanese to communicate with Tokyo directly. Special Branch
intercepted transmissions indicating that the crew was in constant contact with someone
in Japan.107
The Inspector General of Police, Straits Settlements, René Onraet (1887-1952)
recounted in his 1947 memoirs that evidence, like that found on the Shinkyo Maru, of
Japanese intelligence efforts was rarely uncovered by the British. Yet, his post-war
assessment was that this did not matter because the British never developed an effective
counter-intelligence program to combat them. He referred to their fishermen as “’South
Seas Ronin’” and described their operations as a “’Standing Patrol’” that extended all the
way back to Japan.108 The success of the Japanese invasion of Malaya in 1941, along
with other landings in the Southeast Asia region, are proof evident of the effective
gathering of intelligence by the Japanese Naval Special Services. The knowledge that
was provided on landing sites, coastlines, and littoral hydrography collected by the
fishing fleets played an important role in the early Japanese triumphs in the Pacific.109
Japanese Army Intelligence Efforts in Malaya and Southeast Asia
Finally, we shall address the topic of Japanese Army Intelligence. In the 1920s the
Japanese Army established the Tokumu Kikan (Special Service Organization) which
operated initially in Mongolia, Manchuria, and China. The initial area of operations was
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due in no small part to the experiences and fears the Japanese had harbored about these
regions since the turn of the twentieth century. Tensions grew geo-politically in both the
East and West, the Special Service Organization began to open up branches in French
Indo-China, Malaya, and Thailand. Many of the kikans operated covertly under assumed
names, while others were derived their name from their leader like the famous F Kikan,
Fujiwara Kikan, that operated in Malaya in 1941and was named after its commander
Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908-1986).110
Despite the fact that the kikans fell under the authority of the Army General Staff
in Tokyo they had a great deal of autonomy. The General Staff granted the kikans a good
deal of independence, but they also assumed a good deal of it on their own. The character
of the kikan’s commander often determined the level of independence for unit. The most
obvious examples of this self-determination occurred in Manchuria where kikans often
conducted operations without any authorization from Tokyo and in some cases explicitly
against orders from the General Staff.
In general, the kikans fell within the categories of strategic or tactical operations
depending upon the mission they were created for, or assigned to. As a result, some of
them were permanent fixtures in a region or theater while other existed only for a short
period before being dissolved upon the completion, or failure, of their mission. The
kikans that operated within a military unit tended to be semi-permanent and their mission
of a strategic nature. On the other hand, the IJA created temporary kikans for short-term
tactical goals and they often operated in forward areas with very specific short term
objectives. In both cases all clandestine operations, espionage, subversion, and fifth
column activities fell under their purview, the exception being outright military
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intelligence missions. The kikans also acted as a liaison between the Japanese
government and local government officials and/or, depending on the situation, the leaders
of various insurgent and independence groups in the local population.
In mid-1940, the Japanese ramped up the effort to gather intelligence on Malaya
and the surrounding regions. It was during this time that the Imperial Japanese Army
intensified the deployment of its own assets into the region. During these preliminary
efforts matters involving the Soviet Union and China pre-occupied the Japanese military.
It was within this setting that Shinozaki played his part and began the gathering of
intelligence prior to the Battle of Malaya. In early 1941, the strategic and logistical
planning for the Malayan offensive began in earnest but by then Shinozaki was
imprisoned. However, the role played by Shinozaki and others like him illustrate that the
Japanese had started gathering information early. The nature of the information Shinozaki
and his compatriots were compiling proved instrumental to the Japanese success in
December of 1941.111
The Japanese Military Affairs Bureau Unit 82 conducted military planning for the
coming offensive. Unit 82 utilized intelligence developed from the web of agents that had
been cultivated since the end of the First World War. Subsequent to the attack, the Army
General Staff assigned intelligence officers like Fujiwara Iwaichi to lead the clandestine
intelligence divisions within the region. As previously mentioned one of the primary
functions of the kikans, was to establish connections with subversive elements and proindependence factions, and in Fujiwara’s case, it was to make contact with Malayan
independence groups. Through the kikans these grassroots organizations gained financial

111

Brian Bridges, “Britain and Japanese Espionage in Pre-War Malaya,” 31-32; Louis Allen, “Japanese
Intelligence Systems,” 548.

84

support for their cause in return for providing the Japanese with information on
Commonwealth troop strength, disposition, and movement. The kikans were
accomplishing two objectives at once, stirring up anti-British sentiment while obtaining
valuable military intelligence. Fujiwara Iwaichi headed one of these intelligence
operations called Fujiwara Kikan after its leader, F Kikan. Established in 1941, and sent
to Bangkok in September of that same year, the General Staff tasked F Kikan with
contacting the various anti-colonial factions and movements in the region. It achieved
notable success in establishing cooperation between the leaders of several of these
movements and Japan. In February of 1941, British intelligence picked up some of the
aforementioned radio transmissions from these sources. The messages contained
deployment information for Commonwealth forces and their equipment. Additionally,
many of the disaffected Malayans Fujiwara’s unit supported helped to create maps of the
jungles, terrain, and act as guides for the Japanese when they invaded. The information
provided by these spies contributed to the successful invasion in December of 1941.112
Japanese intelligence activities in the Southern Region illustrate how Japan’s intelligence
development was proceeding along similar lines, and a similar pace, as the West. It is
clear that they understood the intelligence cycle. Unit 82 and other intelligence
departments provided planning and direction for assets in the field. The kikans executed
the collection step for the IJA utilizing the OSINT and HUMINT disciplines. The IJA
also engaged many of its informal intelligence networks to achieve its goals. Analysis
and evaluation was conducted in multiple locations. Initially the primary distillation of
the raw data was performed within the units themselves. Then their analysts would create
an intelligence product and disseminate it to the proper departments in Tokyo. All of
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these components contributed to the success the Japanese would achieve when they
invaded Malaya. Prior to the invasion Japanese military leadership had an extensive
knowledge of British Commonwealth forces disposition, capability and weaknesses. The
Japanese engaged and supported native nationalist movement in order to undermine the
British. Finally, due to Japan’s intelligence efforts the military planners had an excellent
lay of the land. Japan’s intelligence system was clearly not the “…unsophisticated,
parochial, fragmented, adamantine, spasmodic and often vague…” operation that many
experts today claim it was.113
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Chapter 4
The Battle of Malaya
The Battle of Malaya, often referred to as the Invasion of Malaya, began on
December 8th 1941 and ended on January 31st of 1942. The opening stages of the attack
occurred just prior to the strike on Pearl Harbor. It was the first major battle of the Pacific
War. From the onset the Japanese had naval and air supremacy. Fighting between the
Imperial Japanese Army and British Commonwealth forces on land dominated the
landscape. The campaign was total disaster for the defending forces as the IJA routed the
British at every turn. One of the notable features of the battle was that the Imperial
Japanese Army utilized bicycle infantry. This allowed the IJA to move swiftly through
the jungles while still carrying a significant amount of equipment. Despite the fact that
British Royal Engineers destroyed over a hundred bridges the IJA was not delayed. This
was due in large part to the extensive intelligence operations that had been undertaken
prior to the battle. The IJA had obtained excellent maps of the region and native guides
that were waiting to lead the troops through the terrain.
The IJA 25th Army invaded the northern coast of Malaya at Kota Bharu on
December 8th of 1941. The IJA also landed at two different places in Thailand and
attacked West into Malaya. On the same day, Japanese air power began an assault on
Singapore. The Japanese quickly isolated defending units of the Indian Army and forced
them to surrender. Thanks to the light tanks, bicycles, and native guides the IJA moved
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swiftly across the country achieving its objectives. The Japanese use of light armor added
to their advantage as the Commonwealth forces had no equivalent. Japanese airpower
was not just superior in number, but also in the quality of aircraft and pilots. What
airpower the British forces did have was quickly destroyed.
The Commonwealth Forces suffered defeat followed by defeat. On December 8th
they attempted to invade Thailand and destroy a key road but failed. On the 10th of
December Japanese aircraft sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the
battlecruiser HMS Repulse, becoming the first capital ships to be sunk solely by aircraft.
What followed were a series of defeats at places like Jitra, Kampar, and Slim River. By
the middle of January 1942, the IJA had reached Johore a southern Malayan state. Johore
marked the first time the Japanese suffered a tactical setback due to the incredibly
stubborn defense mounted by the Australian 8th Division. The Australians were not able
to hold their position for long and after being outflanked fought a withdrawal action that
lasted for four days. On the 20th of January the IJA landed more troops at Endau and the
last Commonwealth defensive line in Johore was under assault for its entire length. With
no fixed defenses to fight from it was only a matter of time before the line collapsed. On
the 27th General Archibald Wavell gave permission for the remaining forces to fall back
to Singapore.
In just under two months’ time, the IJA had handed the British Commonwealth a
stunning and one-sided defeat. Over 50,000 Commonwealth troops were captured or
killed. When the IJA took Singapore another 80,000 were taken prisoner. By the time it
was all over the Japanese had suffered some 9,000 casualties. The Commonwealth forces’
casualties totaled over 145,000, 130,000 of whom were captured. The Royal Navy had
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lost two ships of the line, one of which was the newly completed battleship Prince of
Wales.114 British airpower had been eliminated. The British presence in the Pacific had
been all but removed along with any threat it may have posed Japanese ambitions.
Fujiwara Iwaichi and F Kikan
Since the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese had felt that their position in
Manchuria was necessary for the defense of Korea and ultimately Japan itself. They also
desired the economic gains the resources of the region provided. In the late 1920s
Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek and the successful unification of China were
threatening their position in Manchuria. Simultaneously Russia was beginning to exert
pressure on the region. Within the Japanese government and military there were elements
who concluded that a conflict was in Japan’s best interest because war provided a
legitimate excuse to invade. The invasion would be the means by which Japan could
fortify the area and solidify its control. The result was a false flag operation engineered
by officers of the Kwantung Army now known as the Manchurian Incident. On the 18th of
September 1931, Kawamoto Suemori carefully placed explosives along a section of the
South Manchuria Railway near Mukden. Just after 10 p.m. the charges were detonated.
Kawamoto and his fellow Kwantung Army conspirators intended to derail the Darien
Express and blame the local Chinese warlord. The Japanese used the apparent act of
Chinese terrorism as a pretext to invade, as planned, and occupy Manchuria. The road to
the Pacific War was open.
The Second Sino-Japanese War technically started in July of 1937. The Marco
Polo Bridge incident marks the moment when tensions between Chinese and Japanese
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forces escalated into outright combat. Both the major Western powers in the region,
Britain and America, condemned the Japanese as the aggressor in the region. As the SinoJapanese conflict deepened and consumed more the region, the Western powers began to
take action against the Japanese. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
all imposed economic sanctions on the Japanese in response to their activities. The
situation in the Pacific intensified when Japan allied with Germany and Italy in July of
1941. The Japanese invasion of French Indochina only served to exacerbate the situation.
In response, President Roosevelt seized Japanese assets in America. Shortly thereafter,
both the British and the Dutch followed America’s example. This effectively put Japan
on the defensive as it relied heavily on the import of raw materials and oil to power its
industry and war machine.115
The Japanese began to plan for the impending military clash between themselves
and the Western powers in the Pacific region. The Japanese army had prepared
extensively to fight on the Asian mainland against both the Chinese and the Soviet Union.
It had not trained or planned as extensively to face their potential Anglo-American
adversaries in the vast regions of the Pacific. Facing a potentially vast and drawn out
conflict in the Pacific Japanese leadership looked to places like Burma, the Dutch Indies,
and Malaya to become important battlegrounds. In addition to being rich in resources,
these colonies also possessed populations the Japanese could subvert to fight against their
Western masters. That would make Western resistance to Japanese advances even more
difficult.116
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The indigenous peoples of places like Malaya came to play an important role in
the coming war. Despite the erosion of the national consciousness of colonial populations
caused by years of imperial rule, they still yearned to be free. The Japanese realized that
if they examined and learned what the desires and sentiments of these groups were, then
when war came they would have the ability to assist them. Ostensibly, the efforts aimed
at helping groups, like the Malayans, gain their independence. In return, they would view
the Japanese as liberators and friends. More importantly, in assisting them the Japanese
forced the colonial powers to have to deal with a subversive element that could erode
their power from the inside. They would also be able to provide invaluable assistance and
intelligence to the Japanese in the lead up to war and then during actual conflict itself.
Realizing that Japan and the Western powers were on a collision course, the
Imperial Japanese Army 8th section, Intelligence section, began to investigate the various
courses of action they had available to them. Ultimately, they came up with three
potential courses of action. The first was to pursue a relationship with the Indian
Independence League (I.I.L.). The second was to collaborate with Malayan independence
fighters led by native-born Japanese Tani Yutaka (1911-1942). Tani had immigrated to
Malaya in the late Meiji period and had opened a barbershop. During an anti-Japanese
incident, shortly after the Manchurian Incident, Tani’s six-year-old sister was killed
during an episode of public violence. Afterwards, Tani joined a group of Malayan bandits
and quickly became renowned for both his bold actions and fighting spirit. By the late
1930s he was wanted by the British authorities and by all accounts was leading a force of
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almost three thousand men. It was not long before he was working as an agent for the
Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence section.117
In the fall of 1941 things were heating up fast for Japan. The Army General Staff
was preparing for war of an unprecedented scale in the Pacific against the West. The
Western powers had already employed a number of economic sanctions against the
Japanese in an effort to curtail their activities. In September of 1941 Fujiwara Iwaichi
reported to Army General Staff 8th section officer Lieutenant Colonel Kadomatsu in
Tokyo. Kadomatsu was sending Fujiwara to Bangkok in order to assist Colonel Tamura
Hiroishi in the overseeing of a kosaku (intelligence operation) in Malaya.
Fujiwara’s commanders dispatched him to the region because they believed that
the situation in Malaya would soon degenerate to a state of war with Britain. Fujiwara’s
was officially ordered to”… engage in a kosaku in Malaya in order to assist intelligence
operations, particularly with respect to the I.I.L. [Indian Independence League] and
Malay and Chinese anti-British groups.”118 Fujiwara’s mission encompassed assisting
Japanese military operations, promoting a spirit of cooperation between the Japanese and
Malaya’s disaffected population in the event of hostilities, and to assess the potential “…
Japan-India relations from the standpoint of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.”119 It was Fujiwara’s mission to collect intelligence on the Commonwealth forces,
and to find a way to pit Indians and Malayans against their colonial overlords.120
Since the early 1930s the Japanese had been observing the nationalists in Malaya.
They began providing various independence seeking factions, like the I.I.L., with the
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funds necessary to pursue their endeavors. In Malaya the I.I.L. had and extensive network
of agents and sleeper cells. One of which was responsible for a bout of unrest during a
rubber workers strike in May of 1941. Unable to quell the uprising the estate owners had
to call on the 1/13th Frontier Force Regiment, made up of Indians, to deal with it. This
played into the Japanese hands as “setting Indian against Indian in a foreign land” did
little for either the morale of Commonwealth units or for popular support of the
British.121 The greatest success of the I.I.L. ended up being found within the ranks of the
Indian forces in Malaya. This was to be essential to the later Japanese success because
“49 percent of the combined British/Indian/Australian/Malayan force” was Indian.122
Fujiwara along with his men arrived on the 28th of October in Bangkok. The
Japanese took extraordinary security precautions to protect the men and their mission,
including the use of false identities for the unit. Within a few days of his arrival, Fujiwara
received his orders from Colonel Tamura Hiroishi. “Under my command I want you to
take charge of liaison with the I.I.L. and to assist Tashiro, who is responsible for overseas
Chinese affairs, and Kamimoto, who is in charge of the Harimau kosaku… .”123 As he
was to be the liaison between the Japanese and the I.I.L. Fujiwara was introduced to
Pritam Singh, a leader in the Indian Independence League. The I.I.L. had been attempting
to bring as many Commonwealth soldiers of Indian heritage into their fold as possible
and many of those men were stationed in Malaya. Fujiwara, in time, became the driving
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force behind the creation of the Indian National Army (INA) as a result of his interactions
with the I.I.L.124
As the faceoff between the Japanese and the Western powers in the Pacific
intensified, Japan found itself strapped for needed resources due to economic embargoes.
Shortages of strategic resources, both at the time and foreseen in the future, like rice, tin,
oil, and rubber forced Japan’s gaze to focus on the small countries of Southeast Asia.
Malaya and Thailand could provide the needed tin and rubber. The Netherland East
Indies could provide the oil required and possession of Malaya furnished the easiest path
into that region. Thailand, like Korea, could become Japan’s rice bowl. In the midst of it
all sleepy little Thailand ended up becoming the frontline in an intensive diplomatic and
military intelligence war.125
Thailand’s position geographically in the heart of Southeast Asia made it crucial
to both the West and Japan. The West could use Thailand to check Japanese military
moves in the region. With the proper attention, the West could prevent the Japanese from
acquiring the strategic resources that they so needed and desired in order to continue their
quest for Pacific dominance. On the other hand, it was imperative that the Japanese
establish a foothold in the country. From Thailand they could easily gather intelligence
on the military situation in Malaya and in Burma. It gave them an easy point of
infiltration into both these regions so they could support indigenous independence efforts
and subvert British authority. Thailand, at the outbreak of hostilities, became an
important piece of the puzzle in the victory over the British.
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Over the previous ten years, the Japanese had managed to manipulate people and
events in order to create a pro-Japanese faction within Thailand. Major-General Pibul
Songkram (1897-1964) had seized power in a coup d’état in 1932. In 1938, amidst the
rise of National Socialism, he consolidated his power and became the fascist leader of the
nation. In 1940 he instigated an incident with French Indochina in order to recover
territory lost to the French. The Japanese took notice and intervened as a mediator. By
helping to settle the matter and in the process setting up new borders that were favorable
to Thailand, the Japanese earned support from the Thai government. In return, the
Japanese chose to support Pibul. These events combined with Japanese presence in the
region gave it a louder voice when it came to Thai affairs. Colonel Tamura, whom
Fujiwara had recently reported too in Bangkok, had effectively been the man shaping the
political situation in Thailand. He was without a doubt the leading authority on Southeast
Asian affairs within the region.126
At the time of Fujiwara’s arrival in Bangkok the state of things had become much
more complex and dangerous. The Western powers were desperately seeking any
intelligence that could aide them in defending their holdings, China jockeyed with Japan
for support in the region. Even Germany was eyeing the resources of the region for its
own war effort. Japan’s counter intelligence effort was multi-faceted and involved both
formal and informal operations. They utilized doctors, both civilian and military,
operatives disguised as commercial representatives, military advisers to help with
armaments sold to Thailand, technicians for the railroads, and even Buddhist monks.
In a foreshadowing of things to come, the Japanese intelligence effort suffered
from the kinds of activity that would plague Japan in the latter half of the coming war.
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The lack of a central authority regarding intelligence matters meant that not everyone was
being directed the same. The intelligence collected was sent to various departments, but
often it was not shared as inter department competition was growing. The IJA and the IJN
both operated their own intelligence unit independent of any central control and with
practically no horizontal coordination. This meant that two seemingly innocuous pieces
of data that when combined may have revealed something key to Japanese efforts
potentially never crossed the same desk. Furthermore, the departmental and agency
rivalry extended to the agents in the field. Often times Fujiwara observed, they worked
just as hard to find out what the other Japanese were doing as they did trying to ascertain
data on the enemy. This behavior often led to agents exposing not only themselves but
also other operatives and assets of the Japanese government.127
Fujiwara had his first meeting with one of the I.I.L. leaders, Pritam Singh, at the
residence of Colonel Tamura sometime shortly after he arrived in Bangkok. Fujiwara had
realized before he left Tokyo that the Japanese needed to pursue a policy in Southeast
Asia that sought to understand the various populations’ desire for independence from
Western colonial rule. Through assisting them in gaining their liberation Fujiwara not
only served Japan’s purpose of creating a subversive force, but the Japanese could then
fold that population under their own imperial umbrella afterwards. Fujiwara realized that
the kosaku that he was assigned to needed to have a basis in understanding and utilizing
ideologies that were compatible with the Malayan population.128 Fujiwara's first words to
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Singh were “I have come to help you realize your high ideal [independence] and I look
forward to working together with you.”129
From the start, Singh and Fujiwara appeared as old comrades. Singh openly
shared his political activities and the fact that he had been working for Indian
independence since 1939. He felt betrayed by the British and looked to take advantage of
the apparent coming hostilities in order to achieve his goals. A few days after meeting
Fujiwara, Singh took him to meet a Japanese national named Otaguro who had been
working as an English teacher in Singapore. While Otaguro did not appear to be
interested in any kind of nationalist movement, he held no love for the West. It was
because of the growing Anglo-Japanese tension that he had had to leave Singapore.
Fujiwara made the man his eyes and ears in the city.
Having begun to develop his own network of assets Fujiwara set about coming up
with a system of operations in the region. He wanted to find out from Singh what the I.I.L.
activities were in Thailand and Malaya. How did these coincide with the plans for his
independence movement? Fujiwara needed to know how this could fit into Japan’s plans,
how could it aide their efforts when war came. To make matters difficult, the entire time
Fujiwara was planning for war, he had to be careful not let on to his new cohorts that
Japan was preparing for war against the West.
The importance of the relationship that Fujiwara had with Singh and the I.I.L.
cannot be understated. Indians made up almost fifty percent of the British
Commonwealth forces. The I.I.L. had members stationed in southern Thailand along the
Malayan border and in Kota Bharu on the east coast of Malaya. Singh traveled to these
locations on a monthly basis in order to maintain contact with his people and help to
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distribute anti-colonial propaganda. The I.I.L. was actively trying to win the Indian
soldiers over to its side. The I.I.L. had not been able to infiltrate the British-Indian Army
units that guarded Malaya’s border because of frequent rotations. The Indians in those
units, though, were known to have strong anti-British feelings and be receptive to
propaganda. Singh assured Fujiwara that in the event of hostilities the Indian soldiers
were respond to appeals to turn on their British comrades if I.I.L. officers accompanied
Japanese troops.130
Despite the fact that the I.I.L.’s efforts had not been able to penetrate deep into
Malaya, Fujiwara saw an opportunity. Fujiwara first wanted to use the I.I.L. to organize
Indians within Malaya in order to help expand I.I.L. activities within the country. He also
saw the chance to penetrate into enemy lines by giving Japanese Army support to I.I.L.
agents. Through them, he hoped to win support among Indians in the Malayan civilian
population and with those within the Commonwealth army units. The second goal was
especially important for when hostilities commenced between the two nations. In order to
help win hearts and minds Fujiwara guaranteed the lives of all Indian POWs. This would
illustrate to the Indian POWs and those that remained in Commonwealth service what
Japan’s real intentions were and help to win their support for the I.I.L. and thus the
Japanese.131
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By November relations between Japan and the West had grown stale to the point
that Fujiwara knew that war was inevitable. He found it increasingly difficult to lay
concrete plans for war and yet kept them hidden from his assets like Singh. Over the
course of four meetings Fujiwara discussed the implementation of the plans he and Singh
had made for the I.I.L. Included in those discussions was the admission that Malaya
would become a battleground in the coming conflict. By the end of the sessions Singh
and Fujiwara had not only come to common ground on ideology but also created a pledge
of support to each other. Among the articles in the agreement were statements that
affirmed the I.I.L.’s military support of Japan against Britain in the region, the I.I.L.
would advance with Japanese troops into Malaya and a host of other nations in order to
convert British-Indian troops to the Japanese cause. On the other side of the table the
Japanese pledged to recognize the I.I.L.’s independent actions, guarantee the safety of all
Indian POWs, the IJA would assist the I.I.L. in its propaganda efforts, and provide
monetary and technical support for I.I.L. activities. The pledge was signed and sent to
Tokyo December 1st, 1941.132
F Kikan, under Fujiwara’s leadership, played a significant role in opening up
relations with the various independence movements in the region. These proved to be
invaluable once the Japanese had invaded. They not only provided valuable military
intelligence, but also the native Malayans involved drew maps of routes through the
jungles and some even acted as guides when the invading Japanese landed. Perhaps the
unit’s greatest accomplishment was a direct result of the contact Fujiwara had with
independence leader Pritam Singh. Thanks to the relationship that was developed,
Fujiwara was able to recruit approximately forty thousand Indian prisoners of war into
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what became the Indian National Army (INA). This was a magnificent accomplishment
and posed a very real and very direct threat to the British imperial rule. The INA took
part in operations against the British in 1944 in Arakan and Manipur. At the end of the
war many in the INA were held as complicit in Japanese war crimes and the repatriation
of others resulted in their facing trials for treason. Many historians view these
proceedings as the stimulus for several famous mutinies. They are considered crucial to
the eventual ending of British rule. While the INA, directly or indirectly, seems to have
been more effective in the post-war period, it without a doubt constituted a major military
concern during the war and thus drew British resources and attention away from other
matters. This in and of itself should be considered a success.133
During the invasion of Malaya Japanese units utilized light tanks and, famously,
bicycle infantry. However, the invaders had not actually brought their bikes with them.
They knew from the intelligence gathered by native assets that they could confiscate what
they needed from the local populace. More importantly, they were able to traverse the
tropical rainforests that were interlaced with native paths thanks to the native guides they
had, due in no small part to the efforts of Fujiwara and the F Kikan unit. Fujiwara’s
activities illustrate the usefulness of organizing subversion and guerilla warfare efforts.
Despite the military accomplishments of Fujiwara and his unit, its true success was one
of a political nature.134
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“The Odd Man Out” – Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan
By the time the Japanese launched their offensive in the Pacific they had utilized
their impressive HUMINT network to gather the information they required prior to the
attacks. Japanese intelligence efforts steadily intensified as Japan gained both economic
and military power in the Pacific. Beginning in the 1930s their clandestine efforts had
increased to a point that they were drawing attention and raising concern with British
authorities. Late 1940 and early 1941, at least eighteen months before their attacks, saw a
significant increase in Japanese military intelligence assets deployed to places like
Malaya and Thailand. Agents consisted of embassy staff, Japanese business people,
tourists, and came to include disaffected members of the indigenous populations. The
Japanese had done their due diligence and the reward was a series of sweeping victories
that left the Americans reeling and all but removed the British from the theater for the
rest of the war.135
Malaya, better than any other target, embodied the spirit and achievements of
Japanese intelligence. The Japanese Secret Services, and the intelligence web that they
had created, had successfully constructed a realistic picture of the British Order of Battle
(OOB). That intelligence web, as previously illustrated, consisted of diplomatic, military,
and commercial components. The Japanese had also enlisted the aid of the local
populations and paid informants. Some of those informants had were even British
servicemen as in the Shinozaki incident. Several British servicemen over the previous
years had been bribed into providing the Japanese with information on troop and
weapons deployment, layouts of bases, and even the whereabouts of vessels of the Royal
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Navy. Perhaps, though, the most significant of all these accomplishments was the
recruitment of Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan (1910-1942).136
Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan was a complicated individual. While he appeared
to athletically gifted, academically he was lacking. In 1935 he managed to be selected for
service in the Indian Army but was a misfit from the onset. Many of those who served
with him felt that he walked around with a chip on his shoulder for some reason.
Unbeknownst to them, or the Indian Army, Heenan was illegitimate and this was one of
the primary sources of his rancor. In his time with the Indian Army he was transferred
numerous times. This only added to his feelings of being an outsider. Despite performing
admirably during a campaign on the frontiers, he remained unpopular. Compounding the
issue was the fact that essentially it appeared that he had no desire to remedy his status as
an outcast. In mid to late 1938 he took a six month leave from his unit and traveled to
Japan.137
Captain Heenan took a long leave in 1938. The exact dates of his leave are
unknown to historians, but it began sometime in the fall and lasted into the spring of 1939.
His decision to spend his time in Japan was not unusual for officers of the British and
Commonwealth forces. In some cases the trip to Japan was merely a layover before
returning to England, but for many the entire leave was spent there learning the language
and immersing themselves in the culture and its customs. These extended leaves in Japan
were not frowned upon. With the situation in the East degrading quickly war seemed
inevitable and any and all knowledge of the people and language of a potential enemy
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was welcomed. Likewise, the Japanese Secret Services saw the visiting British officers as
targets of opportunity.138
It is unknown whether Heenan sought out the Japanese or whether he was
approached and recruited like so many other assets. Presently, it appears that any of the
records on Heenan were destroyed at the end of the war along with so many others, and
neither the Japanese Defense Agency nor the National Institute for Defense Studies has
any information on him. There are also no files in any of the records that the United
States confiscated with the Japan capitulation in 1945.
Whatever the circumstances of his recruitment, it is apparent that during his time
in Japan he received instruction on intelligence tradecraft. It is also during this period that
he most likely learned how to operate the radio equipment he used as a spy. The Indian
Army Signals School did not start giving instruction on radio sets until 1941 and there
were few other places that he could have learned the necessary skills to use the
equipment he in possession at the time of his capture. Additionally, he needed instruction
in the codes that he was to use. The period when he learned the codes would have
presented his Japanese handlers the most opportune time in which to teach him how to
use the radio. Heenan’s new Japanese handlers also taught him the art of taking pictures
suited for intelligence purposes. He later proved to have a talent for it. The Japanese
handlers also educated him on the web of espionage they had created in Malaya. He
would have been told who his contacts were too be, some of whom were in the I.I.L. The
entire recruitment in all likelihood was rather routine, as the Japanese did not realize
exactly who they had. Here, was a major failing on their part. Had they done their
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research on Heenan, they may have been able to see how valuable he was, and foresee
how much more valuable he could become. An officer like Heenan had access to
valuable information like daily codes, troop strength, disposition, and the equipment and
supplies available to them.139
Having been recruited by the Japanese intelligence services while he was on
leave in Japan, Heenan returned to Malaya around July of 1939. Heenan was by all
accounts an unpopular fellow and ill-suited for most of his duty postings. After his return
from Japan he served with the 15th Motor Transport Company, but after a short time he
was in trouble for his attitude once again. Apparently, among all the skills that he had
learned in Japan he had failed to learn how to control his temper. In September of 1939
he became involved in a quarrel between the military police and the British Other Ranks
(BORS), non-commissioned officers, and was sent packing to the 1/16th Punjabis.140 This
was not the first, nor the last, transfer for Heenan. While with the 1/16th Heenan
distinguished himself during the Waziristan Campaign but this was not enough to change
others’ opinions of him or to lose his mantle as misfit. As soon as was possible the unit’s
new commanding officer, a Colonel Clarke who took command after the campaign, took
the first available opportunity to make his unit’s problem, someone else’s.141
In October of 1940, Heenan found himself as part of the 2/16th Punjab Regiment
that was being sent to Malaya. It is possible that Heenan requested a transfer to the unit
so as to be in a better position to be useful to his Japanese handlers, but more likely he
was assigned there in yet another instance of British commanders attempting to pass on a
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problem officer. By late October the convoy that the regiment had boarded to travel
Malaya was anchored off Penang and the regiment had disembarked for its new camp.
The regiment’s new location put it very close to the Malay and Thailand border and it
was at this point that Heenan’s handlers really began to put him to work. Patrick made
numerous clandestine trips into Thailand and began passing intelligence.142
Due to being an unpopular fellow and apparently ill-suited for duty in his initial
posting with the 2/16th Punjab regiment Heenan’s commanding officer, Colonel Frank
Moore, requested he be transferred out. One of the many reasons given for the transfer
was his propensity for taking unauthorized trips into Thailand. While this behavior
should have aroused some sort of suspicion, it did not. Furthermore, not only was Heenan
transferred, he was going to be posted to a newly formed intelligence unit and was being
made a Grade Three Intelligence staff officer. The promotion granted him a security
clearance and access to secure facilities. The new posting was in Singapore and the
position was as Air Intelligence Liaison Officer (AILO). This new position provided
Patrick Heenan with extensive access to highly sensitive information that would be
actionable in the eyes of his Japanese handlers. The Air Liaison Unit was involved in the
planning of the ground and air defenses for the northern airfields and the port city of
Penang. The AILO position also afforded Heenan with more freedom to move about,
both on his own and as part of his duties, and he visited a number of airfields in both an
official and unofficial capacity.143
Heenan used his position to glean information where and when he could. Often he
used his rank and its influence to turn unknowing officers into unwitting agents of the
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Japanese. A warrant officer, whose last name was Swindlehurst, stationed at the Alor Star
airfield was one such source for Heenan’s activities.144 Heenan regularly requested that
Swindlehurst drive him about the airfield and give him a detailed account of the
serviceability and availability of the aircraft on hand under the guise of collecting data for
a report or briefing. As Heenan was the AILO, Swindlehurst was obliged to comply with
his requests with no second thoughts. Flight Sergeant Ron Wardrop was another
innocuous individual who became a source of intelligence for Heenan. Wardrop was
Armourer Sergeant for 62 squadron stationed at Alor Star and Heenan frequently queried
him as to the status of stores and request detailed explanations of their purposes. He also
repeatedly inquired as to which aircraft could be armed with what weapons.145
During this time Heenan continued to engage in unsanctioned trips that doubled
as photoreconnaissance missions. In fact, Heenan had grown evermore complacent in his
tradecraft thanks to the lack of any real counter-intelligence efforts by the British. Many
of his activities were beginning to draw suspicion from comrades but also from his
Commanding Officer in the Liaison unit, Major James Cable France. France had
discovered that his “…Photogenic Captain G III – Tom Heenan…” had taken a party of
troops out on supposed exercises and while out had photographed all the roads,
crossroads, and junctions. France later learned of Heenan’s similar trips into Thailand
while stationed with the Punjabi regiment earlier. France also learned that Heenan had
persuaded the Station Commander to allow him access to Frank’s highly secret
documents stored in the Commander’s safe. The complacent attitude toward Heenan
despite the mounting suspicions of his comrades and commanding officer are damning
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evidence of the general British outlook on the Japanese. It was a viewpoint that was
inspired by the fiction of Fortress Singapore and the racist belief that the cartoonish
Japanese could not possibly pose a threat. But pose one they did and Heenan had become
one of their most important tools in Malaya.146
Heenan’s position in the Air Liaison Section was nigh perfect for gathering the
military intelligence Japan needed for its invasion. As an AILO, Heenan had access to
detailed information about the northern airfields, the aircraft stationed at them, their
defenses, their stores, and their OOB. As a grade three intelligence staff officer Heenan
had access to practically everything his handlers could desire. Additionally, Heenan had
been involved in devising the aerial defensive strategy in the event of invasion.
Furthermore, he had access to the then equivalent of the IFF (Identity Friend or Foe)
system that the British were using. This consisted of a set of Air Recognition Strips
which allowed airmen to identify friendly ground forces, and a series of Air Recognition
Codes that allowed friendly pilots to identify each other. As with so many other codes
then, and now, they were supposed to be changed on a daily basis.
Captain Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan potentially made the one of if not the
single biggest contribution to the invasion’s early successes. His role in helping to plan
the defensive aerial response to an invasion and his access to the IFF systems of the time
are now apparent when looking at the events and corresponding reports of December 8th,
1941. At Kota Bharu the Japanese invasion forces were guided to shore by signal lights
displayed by Japanese agents. In response British aircraft were deployed, in the dark, to
attack the Japanese troop transports. Upon arrival the British found their targets flashing
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the correct RAF recognition signal for the day. It is highly probable that they received the
signal and other codes for the day had been provided to them through the efforts of
Captain Heenan.
At the time of the invasion British RAF officers noted that the Japanese were
incredibly successful at knowing where and when to catch the RAF on the ground.
Repeatedly the Japanese caught the RAF pilots after returning from sorties when they
were most vulnerable. Pilots and ground crew watched as the Japanese strafed and
bombed the rows of their stationary aircraft with relative impunity. Basil Gotto, an RAF
pilot, wrote the Japanese had “’… absolute air supremacy,’” and “’Our fighters…were
having no success and were continually being caught having just landed.’”147 Jack Wells,
another member of Heenan’s AIL section, recalled that on the day of the attacks
Heenan’s actions gave away his knowledge. After learning of the attacks on Singapore
and several airfields to the south, Wells inquired as to why they had not yet been hit yet
seeing at they were on the front lines. Heenan’s response was simply that they would be.
Wells recalled that after that exchange Heenan kept looking at his watch and watching a
distinct portion of the sky. Wells realized only in hindsight that “’…he was expecting
them [the Japanese]! He knew exactly when the blighters were coming!’”148 Shortly after
telling Wells the Japanese would arrive, they did. Once over the airfield they proceeded
to bomb the rows of parked aircraft being refueled and re-armed. Prior to the attack Wells
and several other servicemen on the airfield re-called Heenan having disappeared, most
likely radioing the Japanese of the impending arrival of British aircraft.
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Time and again the RAF was being caught unawares after missions. In a report
compiled in 1942 by General Wavell this was attributed to information being sent via
radio from the area around the aerodromes. The agent in question was no doubt Captain
Heenan. The timing of the attacks on the airfields is strong evidence of his complicity. As
Jack Wells had observed there was no reason that the Japanese should have ignored Alor
Star due to its position to the north of several other targets, including a nearby airfield
that had been attacked at about 0730. The Japanese did not attack Alor Star was until
1100 hours despite its close proximity to other frontline targets. Strategically and
tactically there was no reason to ignore Alor Star, unless the Japanese knew that the
field’s aircraft were out on sortie. The Japanese raid on Alor Star coincided perfectly with
the return of its aircraft. The Japanese knew that an attack on Alor Star was pointless
until Heenan had informed them of the RAF aircrafts’ return. Eventually the raids on
Alor Star and its neighboring airfields resulted in the order to evacuate. Only a handful of
obsolete Buffalo fighters and Blenheim bombers survived.
The information that Heenan had provided the Japanese at the time of the invasion was,
by all accounts, limited to the northern airfields. It proved to be disastrous for the British
as the Japanese used it to devastating effect. Within the opening days of the Battle of
Malaya they were able to force the British to abandon their frontline airfields, destroy the
majority of the RAF and Commonwealth air forces, and ensure their own air superiority
for the duration of the campaign. British Intelligence got on to Heenan and arrested him
two days after the attacks on Malaya. Among the things discovered when his quarters
were searched were sensitive documents, a codebook, and two radio transmitters. Among
the documents were situation reports that he should not have been in position of. At the
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time of his arrest contemporary sources actually place him at the head of a vast network
of Japanese spies that operated between Penang and the Thai border. As an AILO Heenan
had access to secret information and he had been passing it on to the Japanese. Heenan
was arrested after having been caught sending the current condition and deployment of
aircraft to the Japanese, thus allowing them to repeatedly catch the pilots and planes on
the ground. After his apprehension, Heenan was court-martialed in January of 1942, and
summarily executed for his crimes in February of that same year.149
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Chapter 5
IJA Intelligence Collection Activities
At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese destroyed many of the records
that pertained to their intelligence gathering activities. This has left modern historians
with questions on not only how intelligence was gathered, but also what intelligence the
Japanese did collect. However, there is enough surviving information to begin to give
answers to some of these questions. A textbook used by the Japanese Army titled Joho
Kinmu no Sanko (Text Book for Intelligence Duties) categorized intelligence gathering as
belonging to one of two groups, information gathering or information duties. The
intelligence activities carried out by attachés, businesses, corporations, and other overseas
organizations fell under information gathering. Both OSINT and HUMINT played a large
part in this category, as did observation, photography, and the debriefing of individuals.
Lower levels of SIGINT were also categorized as information gathering. Information
duties included spotting, use of reconnaissance units to locate targets, POW debriefs,
captured documentation, and battlefield espionage.150
Clearly, the IJA was delineating between short-term, information duties, and long
term, information gathering, operations as it planned for the invasion of Malaya. This was
also something that both Britain and America did, and still do. The long term collection
of data allowed Japan to understand the Malay region, its geography, and its population
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in a manner that the British did not. The Japanese long term efforts yielded significant
results that included the readiness, disposition, and deployment of British Commonwealth
forces. Their efforts alerted them to, and allowed them to target, disaffected portions of
the populous that could help to undermine British authority. These early efforts also
yielded geographical information that was essential in both planning the invasion and
then navigating the terrain once their forces had landed. These activities are evidence that
at the start of their Pacific thrust in 1941 the Japanese had an effective method of
analyzing the data they had gathered, producing a useful product, and disseminating it
along the proper channels to those who needed it.
The term HUMINT carries with it the suggestion of James Bond-esque espionage.
In reality, the majority of it is accomplished using attachés stationed in foreign embassies.
IJA attachés collected information from their foreign counterparts, military officers, and
collected OSINT from the local regions publications and news services. They also hired
locals to act as their own personal assets and many embassies had a substantial budget for
exactly that purpose. In 1941 alone the Imperial Japanese Army spent approximately 32
billion yen, adjusted for inflation, on these types of intelligence operations. By the end of
the war that amount ballooned to nearly 320 billion yen adjusted. The HUMINT activities
of the IJA fell into three distinct categories: 1) against the European nations in the
Southern Area (including Malaya and Singapore); 2) against Russia in Manchuria 3);
against China.151
The vast web of spies the IJA cultivated produced results that were just as
significant as any major intelligence coup and were just as useful in helping to defeat the
Commonwealth forces. Many Japanese attachés, businessmen, and native Malayans went
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on photographic excursions. These trips provided the Japanese with an abundance of
useful intelligence for the invasion. They helped to map the network of local trails and
roads that ran along the Malaya and Thailand border. The condition of these roads, their
bridges, connections and intersections, and their ultimate destinations were of vital
importance to the Japanese. Ultimately, the information helped the Japanese forces to
advance through terrain that would have otherwise been foreign and impossible to
navigate. F Kikan’s subversion efforts made this even easier.
In the years before the war the Japanese utilized their attachés to collect a
substantial amount of intelligence. The collecting happened in the West just as frequently
and with just as many positive results as it did in the Southeast Asian countries. IJN
Captain Sanematsu Yuzuru and several other fellow IJN officers were stationed across
the United States in places like Los Angeles and Washington where they collected
information on the US Navy. Back in the Japan IJA officers who were considered experts
on selected countries were sent to those regions to gather intelligence. Sometimes as part
of a ryugakusei other times covertly. Yet others were sent to places like Spain, Finland,
and Sweden. The intelligence collected by IJA officers sent to Europe has been assessed
as having a high degree of accuracy. Japanese planning and collection activities were not
only selecting targets of importance tactically and operationally, they were executing on
their plans as well.152
The Imperial Japanese Army collected significant amounts of data on the troop
deployments of various Western powers in the Far East. This information included
HUMINT and COMINT that was then classified according to its accuracy. Japanese
intelligence operations also employed OSINT extensively. In the 1930s this was a
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developing field of intelligence gathering, still in its nascent stages. It was not until 1941
that the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service turned radio into a source of information
for the US. There were also agencies in every country that collected the periodicals and
trade publications for analysis. Colonel William Donovan (1883-1959) was once advised
that he could find better intelligence than could be provided by anyone in the West on the
state of Japanese shipbuilding by simply analyzing the Japanese press. The Japanese, for
instance, were able to stay abreast US aerospace development by monitoring Aviation
Week. This earned the publication the moniker “Aviation Leak” as a result of the
intelligence it provided. Once hostilities commenced OSINT was a way to replace some
of the intelligence lost as a result of the removal of Japanese personnel when embassies
closed. The Domei News Agency for instance compiled, translated, and passed on the
news from every country around the world on a daily basis. With these efforts came the
task of deciphering the true intentions behind a nation’s published news, and of whether
it was factual or not. Confirmed Japanese OSINT sources for the pre-war years included
Reuters, AP, The New York Times, Life, and Time magazine.153
Photography played a key role on all the sides during the war. Especially
important was professional press photography. The Japanese in one instance learned of
the latest British anti-aircraft (AA) weaponry when a picture of dignitaries arriving on the
British battleship King George V was printed in the January 1941 Life magazine. In the
background was Britain’s latest AA rocket launcher. Considering that at the time the
most advanced IJN AA weaponry was still machine guns, this was a significant piece of
intelligence. When the Japanese took the Palembang oil fields in Sumatra, they utilized
the local maps provided in easily obtained publications. Detail was then added to the
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maps, in addition to data on oilfields and airfields, provided Japanese businesses
operating in the area.
At the onset of the Pacific War Japan’s chief opponent were the British Forces
deployed in Malaya. Because of this the IJA increased intelligence gathering on the
British in the late 1930s and then stepped up operations again in late 1940 as a precursor
to war. One of the key assessments that made by the Japanese intelligence community
was that the British colonial garrisons were a composite force. The Japanese appraisal of
Commonwealth forces concluded they were comprised primarily of men from the nations
of Great Britain, India, and Australia. The Japanese then went on to evaluate each of the
three groups. The British they assessed as being a difficult enemy to overcome in battle,
but due to being colonial forces and limited in number they would fall. The Japanese also
predicted that the Commonwealth forces would fight a predominantly defensive battle as
most were stationed in defense of Singapore. The Japanese prediction played out to be
unequivocally true as all but one of the British actions was defensive in nature. Thus in
the invasion of Malaya they would not play a significant factor. The Japanese evaluated
the Australians as being poorly trained and poorly equipped. They would present a
difficult fight based on their national character, stubbornness and bravery, but in the end,
they too would fail to stop a Japanese attack. This also came to pass as the Australians
mounted an uncompromising defense of Johore and handed the Japanese Army its first
tactical setback of the campaign. Finally, and maybe most importantly, the Japanese
appraised the Indian and Malayan soldiers as having no desire to fight for the British.
Instead, the Japanese discovered most of them to have anti-British sentiment and the
Indians were evaluated as being highly fractured. The British had been able to manipulate
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the various Indian and Malayan factions in order to prevent unity and maintain power.
This meant that the British had almost no real support in a fight against an invader. If the
Japanese took the time to understand the Indian and Malayan demographics and their
motivations, they would have a powerful tool to use against the British.
While the Japanese seemed to think lightly of British Commonwealth soldiers, the
key element that they hit upon was the disharmony between the British and their colonial
subjects. Even though the Japanese believed the British troops possessed a reasonable
fighting ability, their relations with their Indian comrades and the native soldiers was
poor at best. As a result, they had undermined their own ability to mount any significant
defense of Malaya. The detailed intelligence gathering operations preceding the Malayan
invasion meant that the Imperial Japanese Army not only had a clear picture of the
geography on which it was going to fight, the military capability of forces it would face,
but that it also had a firm grasp on the social makeup of its opponent.
In the period preceding the invasion F Kikan lead the way in subverting British
authority. As a long-term strategy the Japanese expended a considerable amount of
resources supporting and encouraging various Asian independence movements. The
lion’s share of the effort was concentrated on the Indians, both civilian and those in the
Commonwealth forces, living in Malaya. Japanese intelligence had identified, and rightly
so, this distinct group as being the most susceptible to their efforts. F Kikan in particular
had been instrumental in implementing this strategy in Malaya. The unit targeted Indian
nationals and quickly set up a network of subversive agents across all of northern Malaya.
As a result of its contact with and support of the IIL the Japanese had nurtured feelings of
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colonial resentment not only in the local populations but also among the ranks of the
Commonwealth forces.
Because of the Japanese subversive efforts, its army units had local guides to help
them navigate Malaya and that some of the Commonwealth units turned on and betrayed
their British officers. Because the Indian Army constituted almost half of the
Commonwealth forces in Malaya, the ability to sow discord among them was an
important factor in their campaign and one that is often overlooked today when studying
the Battle of Malaya. Captain Heenan was a white Indian officer who exhibited empathy
towards his Indian comrades while harboring vast resentment against his British peers.
He stands as an example of what the Japanese efforts highest goals were.
As was previously indicated in this thesis, Thailand served as the base of
intelligence gathering activities in Southeast Asia. As the only independent nation in the
region it was possible for Japanese intelligence agencies to set up bases of operation in
cities like Bangkok. From these locations they were able to concentrate their efforts on
the targets in the region that held the most value to them, places like Malaya and
Singapore. From his headquarters in Bangkok, Colonel Tamura Hiroshi collected
information on geography, cartography, British Commonwealth forces, and other areas of
interest vital to the coming war effort. Tamura executed a methodical analysis of the
routes the IJA would take through southern Thailand and the landing points it would use
on the Malay Peninsula. These studies were essential to the early surprise and success
that the Japanese enjoyed in the Battle of Malaya.
Starting in the summer of 1940 the Japanese intelligence efforts in the Southeast
Asia region targeting Malaya and Singapore had increased rapidly. This was because of
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the coming war with Britain. The activities that the Japanese took clearly demonstrated
the same well-developed features as their Western counterparts as discussed above. The
Japanese were planning their missions and targets on a vast strategic level in Tokyo.
However, they were planning also from a strategic, tactical, and operational standpoint on
a lower level from bases situated within the regions of interest to them. They were
exercising all the same collections techniques as the West and from their success we can
glean the fact that their analysis and dissemination of the finished intelligence product
was also effective. Simply put, British and Allied failures in the Pacific were not purely a
symptom of unpreparedness and underestimation of the Japanese. Instead when looking
at the larger picture and including the Japanese narrative, it can be observed that success
like the Battle of Malaya were the result of a long term intelligence operation that aided
in the advanced training of Japanese forces for the coming fight.
While none of the information discovered or revealed to date points to an
intelligence homerun for the Japanese, they were nevertheless able to gather enough
pieces of the puzzle overall to make a significant impact on their operations in late 1941.
At the start of their invasion of Malaya their intelligence and subversion efforts had set
the stage for a highly successful campaign. The Japanese spun a great web of espionage
over Southeast Asia utilizing military, commercial, and civilian sources in its
construction. Examples of military intelligence Japanese successes included the
acquisition of information on RAF facilities and a naval base that was under construction.
The RAF data was obtained from an RAF aircraftsman. The plans for the naval base were
purchased in 1933. In 1934 a Japanese businessman failed in an attempt to purchase the
plans to another RAF base. Other intelligence efforts include the attempt to obtain
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diagrams and maps of railway networks for various regions within Southeast Asia. In
1937 they successfully secured the plans to the Woodlands Railway switch that operated
between Malaya and Singapore as a border crossing checkpoint. Prior to gaining the
plans to the Woodlands switch, Japanese intelligence efforts had procured the drawings
of the Causeway that linked the mainland and Singapore. Additionally, they gained vital
information on the submarine and coastal defenses located throughout Malaya. One
British agent even provided them a list of fifth columnists to help carry out sabotage
work.154
The vast web of Japanese pre-war espionage in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
reached as far south as Australia, west into India, and as far east as Hawaii. Inspector
General of Police, Straits Settlements, René Onraet made, perhaps, the best assessment of
Japanese intelligence activities in Malaya. Writing in 1945, Onraet mused on how the
Japanese had spent the better part of twenty years after the Great War expanding their
trade, understanding, and presence in Malaya. They were everywhere, or at least it
appeared that way. The British and other Europeans saw the activities of the Japanese
travelers, photographers, and those from other various and sundry occupations as a real
threat. The reality was that the managers, chair people, and chiefs of major business and
banking institutions were the real danger. This included those individuals posted in
government facilities like Shinozaki Mamorou.155
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As Onraet recollected the Japanese activities, he fell convinced that what he had
observed was the slow and calculated preparation for the events that unfolded in the late
1930s and culminated with the defeat of the British Commonwealth forces in the Battle
of Malaya. It was easy for them, Onraet surmised, because no one considered that a
future military success would be possible. Malaya was the Gibraltar of the East. Yet, not
only was it possible, but it depended on the patient intelligence gathering effort the
Japanese had embarked on after World War 1. It was an effort based on the highly
developed intelligence system that the Japanese had spent the last seventy plus years
developing. By 1938 Onraet had been so deeply concerned about the level of espionage
in Malaya, conducted in large part by the Japanese employed in commercial endeavors,
that he had introduced legislation requiring that at least half of those companies’
employees be non-Japanese. His warning and concerns went unheeded.156
Refining the IJA Intelligence System
The late 1930s were a tumultuous time for the Imperial Japanese Army. The
Army General Staff began to consider ways to boost their intelligence gathering
capabilities. The bolstering of open source intelligence gathering and signals intelligence
analysis was a primary concern. At the same time an effort was being led to revise the
Military Secret Act and make intelligence work more methodical and scientific. The act
had been created in 1894 just after the First Sino-Japanese War and had remained
virtually unchanged since then.157
Several major changes occurred in the IJA intelligence apparatus in 1936. The
Japanese formed a Russian section in order to intensify collections against that nation and
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to alleviate the overload on the European and American sections who, up until that point,
had also taken on the task of covering Russia in addition to their normal duties. A
Conspiracy section was created as direct result of the attempted military coup in Tokyo
known as the February 26th incident.158 The IJA also formed a counter-intelligence
section at this time. Then in 1937 the institution that became the famous Nakano School
was established.
There were two primary reasons for the creation of the Nakano School. Prior to its
formation the IJA recruited its intelligence officers from the foreign language college or
the Army Staff College. The number of graduates from the former was limited and the
latter did not teach of the intelligence skillset necessary for intelligence operations. In the
majority of the cases the newly hired foreign language graduates gained the needed skills
through on the job experience. IJA intelligence was severely understaffed and it needed
qualified, trained, individuals to fill its ranks in order to fulfill its mission. The Nakano
School provided the solution to those issues. The school had four objectives: 1) bring the
Japanese intelligence apparatus back up to speed as compared to its Western
counterparts; 2) utilize the latest scientific, logic, and technological innovations for
analysis; 3) exploit the skills and specialties of its staff; 4) develop its members to their
fullest potential. The school also invested in an ideological education for its students. The
goal of this was to create intelligence professionals who would be resistant to corruption
and temptation.159
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The creation of the Nakano School appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in
the Imperial Japanese Army’s intelligence system. It also contributed to the preparations
for the Pacific War. Ultimately, the Nakano School would send almost two thousand of
its graduates into the PTO. The IJA had thus improved its intelligence. From 1936
forward it dealt more efficiently with Russia and it stepped up its operations against the
British. However, it failed to make major advancements in its overall efforts against the
United States.
In the Southern Region Fujiwara Iwaichi and his IJA intelligence unit, F Kikan,
supported local independence movements. The movements helped to erode the strength
of the Commonwealth forces garrisoned in Malaya and Singapore. Prior to the War F
Kikan made contact Yutaka Kani and Pritam Singh. Singh was a member of the I.I.L. and
together with Fujiwara Iwaichi he negotiated IJA support for the I.I.L. That agreement
stipulated that in the case of war the I.I.L. would use its influence to draw
Commonwealth Indian forces away from their units utilizing propaganda and other
methods. Yutaka Tani led a band of Malayan freedom fighters that numbered over three
thousand strong. Fujiwara used him and his army as an informal intelligence source
gathering crucial information on Malayan affairs and organizations.
Once the Japanese thrust into the Pacific had started I.I.L. teams went to the front
with F Kikan officers and began to recruit Indians from the Commonwealth units,
persuading them to switch sides. Upon the British surrender of Singapore the Japanese
took 45,000 Indian POWs. Fujiwara informed them that they would not be POWs but
instead would become the nucleus of an army the goal of which was the liberation of
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India. He then presented them to their new commander Mohan Singh formerly of the
British Indian Army. This group became the First Indian National Army.
Examining the IJA intelligence activities of the IJA in the Southern Area it
becomes apparent the Britain’s defeat was unavoidable. IJA intelligence activities
carefully and thoroughly explored the topography of Malaya, probed British military
affairs, and scrutinized the politics of the region. The kosakus identified unrest among the
Commonwealth forces and conducted operations with the goal of creating division with
the British ranks. It must be acknowledged that the British also handicapped themselves.
They failed to engage in any serious counter-intelligence activities and they failed to
objectively evaluate their opponent. Instead they relied on subjective analysis based on
unscientific ethnic beliefs that rated the IJA as a second rate force. While these definitely
factored into the British defeat, in no way should they detract from the capability and
effort the Japanese displayed in their intelligence operations in the region.
Analysis and Exploitation
Analysis is the process that creates a useful intelligence product out of the
information that is collected. While the current narrative says that the Japanese system of
exploitation was inadequate, this was far from the truth. It is true that prior to the war the
Japanese had no overarching organization that could integrate the data from the multiple
intelligence departments that existed. The respective intelligence sections of the IJA and
the IJN unilaterally performed analysis of the collected information. The final results,
intelligence product, would then be reported to the other sections within the parent
organization. The primary recipients of the intelligence were the various operations
departments. During the analysis of the intelligence, the Japanese officers would judge
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the reliability of the intelligence, exactly like today. Their Kakudo (level of certainty)
consisted of four ratings: 1) Ko (certain), must be confirmed by SIGINT, OSINT, and
HUMINT; 2) Ostsu (almost certain), confirmed by two out of the three elements; 3) Hei
(a bit uncertain), this was assigned to information obtained for the first time but with an
analytical context; 4) Tei (uncertain), no confirmation of any sort. Captain Sanematsu
Yuzuru writing on the topic of the confidence that the Japanese had in their analysis and
evaluation practices commented on the different levels of the intelligence cycle they used.
He wrote that it was comprised of four individual steps: 1) collection; 2) evaluation; 3)
distillation; 4) judgment.160 It is obvious how that process very nearly mirrors the one
used as an analytical model for this thesis. The distillation step, step three for the
Japanese, corresponds with the analysis and production step of the model used here. The
Japanese began the habit of checking the accuracy of their work against the actual actions
of their enemy. Any discrepancy between the analysis and fact was examined to see
where the fault was and to ascertain if it was correctable. This was the judgement stage,
stage four for the Japanese, and it corresponds to the evaluation stage in the ODNI
Intelligence cycle model presented in this thesis. The difference between the two
intelligence cycles lies in the fact that the evaluation step in the presented model is both a
distinct step an ongoing background process that occurs at every point in the cycle. This
illustrates how the Japanese were not only analyzing, but also judging the quality of the
intelligence that they were producing. The Japanese use of objective standards and a
defined process in analyzing their intelligence proves that their intelligence system was
operating as efficiently, if not more so, and in a similar manner to their Western
counterparts.
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Where was the failure?
To this day there is a lack of understanding of Japanese military and intelligence
capabilities during World War II. This has led to the continued belief that their early
successes had more to do with Western failures and incompetence then their own hard
work and planning. This stems from the same attitude that led the British to
underestimate their capabilities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans prior to the opening of
hostilities. Upon closer examination, it is apparent that the Japanese not only had all the
military virtues that the West so coveted but also had similar resources and capabilities,
especially in the realm of intelligence gathering. So why did the Japanese ultimately lose
the intelligence war?
One aspect that must be considered was the acceptance and use of intelligence by
field commanders. In the Japanese military the reception of intelligence varied greatly
from commander to commander. While this was a problem that was seen in the West, it
potentially was not as severe as it was in the Japanese military ranks. For some Japanese
commanders intelligence was not a highly regarded function. Notable within the context
of this work is the case of Lieutenant General Mutaguchi. Stationed in Southeast Asia, he
believed that the fighting spirit of his men was all that was required to achieve his goals
and the failure of his campaign to invade India rested squarely on his disregard of the
intelligence provided to him on enemy disposition and strength. On the other hand,
Lieutenant General Sakurai’s Chief of Staff, Major-General Iwakura Hideo, was
dedicated to the use of intelligence. In his employ was an agent who had been trained in
Cairo and spoke Arabic. The use of this agent led to the successful recruitment of assets
among the Muslim populations in Arakan. Then there was Major Hachisuka Mitsuo who
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infiltrated British lines in a Burmese disguise and sent detailed intelligence on British
unit strength, position, and the surrounding terrain to his handlers.
The failure of some IJA commanders to accept intelligence as being important to
their overall success raises the question of how well the Japanese army applied the
Intelligence Cycle to its operations. The first step of the cycle is Planning and Direction.
Prior to the Battle of Malaya, there was a top down approach to intelligence. IJA General
Staff in Tokyo were making decisions on what the goals were and deploying assets.
Fujiwara Iwaichi and the other kikan commanders are proof of this. That is not to say that
there was not planning and direction going on at lower levels, there was. The majority of
that kind of activity, though, seemed to fall into categories where discretion and
autonomy were required in order to fulfill the larger mission at hand. This kind of
operation lies in stark contrast to what was going on in China in the 1930s when IJA
elements were acting completely of their own accord, and often against orders, and in the
latter of half of WW II when things began to fall apart thanks to rivalry within the
Japanese ranks.
The Second step of the Intelligence Cycle is Collections. Prior to the Invasion of
Malaya and on through the Pacific War the Japanese excelled at both HUMINT and
OSINT. These were by far the Japanese military’s strongest two collection disciplines
and their successes during their thrust into the Pacific in early 1941 stand as an example
of how important these were. The Battle of Malaya was a one sided affair because of the
intelligence Japanese operatives, both formal and informal, were able to collect on the
British Commonwealth forces’ disposition, makeup, deployment, and readiness. Later in
the war, these continued to be Japanese intelligence’s strong suites. Thanks to OSINT,
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IJN intelligence was able to accurately assess American Naval losses in several battles
and even predict the time and location of several USN offensives. Unfortunately, these
came at a time in the war when operations ignored intelligence reporting for a myriad of
reasons.
The third and fourth steps of the cycle are Processing and Exploitation, and
Analysis and Production. Both the IJA and the IJN performed these step unilaterally. This
was the result of not having a central governing agency or department for intelligence
operations. Virtually every other nation in the conflict shared this failure. As a result, bits
of information acquired by one agency that would have completed a picture when paired
with data from another agency never passed across the same desk. Vertical
communication meant that transmission of intelligence from one intelligence operations
department to another was difficult, if not impossible. Inter-service and political rivalries
compounded the problem in the latter stages of the war. These issues affected the final
step of the Intelligence Cycle, Dissemination, as well. By the second half of the war
information was not being shared openly and there were even cases of competing
intelligence agencies keeping tabs on each other in order to curry favor.
The last component of the Intelligence Cycle is Evaluation. It is not only the sixth
step but also an ongoing process during each of the other five steps. Japanese intelligence
operations illustrate an objective and scientific approach to the evaluation of intelligence.
Early on IJA and IJN intelligence departments are applying complex mathematical
formulas and algorithms to categorize data. Japanese analysts were also grading the
reliability of the information based on specific criteria. The IJA and the IJN were
invested in the development and utilization of professional analysis. During this time they
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can be accessed as being ahead of the US and Britain in that both of those countries were
performing intelligence through power versus intelligence through mind. Ultimately,
steps four through six suffered from the previously stated flaws in addition to a creeping
top down corruption that resulted from commanders not wanting to communicate bad
news to their superiors for fear of reprisal.
In the 1930s the Japanese goal was create a Pan-Asian economic bloc. The
defensive plan chosen by the politicians failed to include both the IJA and the IJN. Since
the IJA and IJN each had their own political component the defense plan essentially
allowed for three separate goals to be pursued. The failure to unite all three entities in a
common purpose would have long lasting effects. At the breakout of the Second World
War the government and the IJA favored an alliance with Germany while the political
component of the IJN resisted the idea. During the 1940s the part that intelligence played
in the larger strategic plan was limited. Both political and military Japanese leadership
contained many individuals who did not necessarily see the value of foreign intelligence.
This was a symptom of the fact that bureaucrats in the government, IJA, and IJN were
dictating grand strategy simultaneously. Complicating the matter further was the fact that
none of three groups involved were operating from the same playbook. The result was
that the decision making process did not require intelligence to proceed. Instead, it
needed personal and departmental connections to get decisions made.
Complicating matters was the fact that the Japanese had no body dedicated to
making decisions on Japanese Grand Strategy. The role had originally been filled by the
Genro, veteran advisers to the Emperor, but by the start of the 1930s the last of those had
died. The result was a power vacuum that the IJA tried to fill. Unfortunately, the IJA’s
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specialty was tactical and not strategic planning. By the late 1930s as the IJA attempted
to fill the role left vacant by the deceased Genro the it tried to formulate both political
and military strategy. Ultimately, the IJA’s decisions and efforts precipitated the SecondSino Japanese War and lead to the Pacific War. This illustrates the failure of high level
Japanese military and political leadership to integrate the intelligence that they possessed.
The model that both the IJA and IJN followed internally at their lower levels that ensured
dissemination of information was absent at the higher levels of control. The struggle for
political power at these higher levels contributed considerably to this issue. As the
Second World War progressed this failure to integrate would creep down through the
levels of leadership and was one cause of the eventual rift between intelligence sections,
operations departments, and command.161
There were also numerous cases of Japanese codes being read. This was more of
an issue for the IJN than the IJA. Most famous amongst the naval failures are those that
led to the disastrous Battle of Midway and the loss of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (18841943). The effect of these compromises on IJN policy, strategy, and the overall state of
the war cannot be ignored. Yet in the case of the IJA effective counterintelligence
apparatuses existed and there is no proof of IJA ciphers being read until late in the war.
Despite the compromises the IJN leadership failed to enact any countermeasures.
Furthermore, the IJN failed to investigate thoroughly the reason for the compromises and
thus did not know what the proper countermeasures were. The Japanese responses to
these events and others later on are problematic in that they did not approach even a low
level of counterintelligence. The lack of IJN counterintelligence awareness was the root
of several major issues. The IJA did not suffer from this malady.
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Another issue that plagued Japanese intelligence operations was the misuse and
misappropriation of talented personnel as either a result of incompetence or inter-service
rivalry. Concerning the outfits described in this thesis Major Fujiwara Iwaichi stands as
an example of this kind of bungling. Fujiwara, the successful leader of F Kikan, was
reassigned to General Headquarters soon after the invasion of Malaya was complete. This
mistake precipitated a later crisis in which the relationship between the Indian subversive
elements, the newly formed INA, and the Japanese fell apart. Fujiwara’s replacement,
Major-General Iwakuro Hideo, was a capable individual militarily speaking. What he
lacked was any experience in dealing with the Indians in Malaya. He was too rigid and
inflexible, and he failed to understand the feelings, aspirations, and motivations of his
allies. As a result, whenever there was a difference of opinion on matters his attitude was
not helpful. Instead, Iwakuro often took on a position of superiority and arrogance
bolstered by Japan’s military successes. Eventually this led to a loss of close co-operation
and both sides became distrustful of the other’s motives. This cost the Japanese valuable
assets in terms of intelligence and military operations.162
The Americans also made similar grievous mistakes in the management of their
personnel. Joseph Rochefort stands as an example of the latter in American intelligence
history. Assigned to Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor, Rochefort was sure the next Japanese
attack would be in the Central Pacific. Meanwhile, a competing intelligence group, OP20-G, based in Washington was positive it would be somewhere else. The time of the
attack was also a source of disagreement between the two operations. Rochefort and his
group devised a simple test to determine what the target was and succeeded in revealing
that it was Midway. Ultimately, Rochefort was correct about both the location and time
162
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of the attack. Soon after, Rochefort was re-assigned to command a floating dry dock, the
result of embarrassing the commander of OP-20-G who just happened to be the brother of
the Director of Naval Communications, Rocehfort’s boss.
One of the largest issues that the Japanese faced was a lack of intelligence
dissemination amongst different elements of the military. Information silos became
common practice as the war progressed. By the latter half of the war not only were the
various agencies not sharing intelligence but they were actively keeping tabs on one
another in an effort to gain favor among the leadership. This was compounded by the
leadership of each service relying more on its own assessments than on the information
gathered by its respective intelligence agency. It became so bad in the Imperial Japanese
Army by the end of the war that its intelligence division was absent any real function.
The situation was muddied further when policy and operations departments also began to
compile and disseminate their own intelligence product. It became almost impossible in
many instances to have an objective grasp of any situation as a result of the sheer volume
of information that had been acquired.
A perfect example of this was when Japanese Naval Intelligence ascertained that
an attack on the Marianas by the USN was imminent. They even correctly judged the
window for the attack to be from May to June. The Naval Operations Bureau, though,
decided to ignore the Intelligence Bureau’s assessment of what became the Battle of the
Philippine Sea. Part of the issue was that the Operations Bureau was conducting its own
analysis of available information, and amateur individuals with little to no actual
intelligence experience were doing it. The situation was made worse because operations
and intelligence existed within different silos. Additionally, the men in the intelligence
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arms of the service often drew criticism and derision from those in operations because
they “’… were not in the field of action, and they did not see the results. It is inexcusable
for them to comment on war results….’”163 The effects of this attitude can be seen in the
tabulation of the battle results. A famous example of this kind of problem was the
misreporting of the battle results from the Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa. The Intelligence
Bureau of the IJN had determined through intercepted communications and open source
intelligence that at best the USN had lost one carrier and one battleship. Operations had
claimed, however, that the Japanese sunk nineteen carriers and four battleships. The USN
had only had seventeen carriers in the operation. Had this been true that victory would
have meant the annihilation of the entire USN carrier force in the Western Pacific.
Another example of the ineptitude of IJN Operations to assess intelligence accurately was
the fact that over the course of the war they claimed that the Saratoga had been sunk four
times and the Lexington six times, a discrepancy that even the Emperor had commented
on.164
When looking at the larger picture of the entire Pacific War, it becomes clear that
in the early stages of the conflict Japanese intelligence was both well developed and
incredibly effective. The Japanese intelligence apparatus was utilizing all the steps of the
intelligence cycle that the West was with as much acuity.165 Furthermore, the military, the
IJA in particular, utilized the information provided them to great effect at the beginning
of war as has been shown. The Battle of Malaya is a valuable case study supporting that
163

Ken Kotani, “Japanese Intelligence in World War II,” 3.
Ken Kotani, “Japanese Intelligence in World War II,” 24-26.
165
This in fact makes complete sense when the entire history of Japan’s transformation from 1865 forward
is taken into account. The missions to the West had taught the Japanese, both directly and indirectly, the
value of intelligence. The Japanese had learned the practices and processes of Western intelligence and had
developed them as highly as the West in order to prevent themselves from becoming another victim of its
colonial expansion.
164

132

conclusion. The result is that historians must discard the old idea that Japanese success
was primarily the product of Allied negligence. Instead, the strategic and tactical success
of the Japanese rested squarely on their patient application of intelligence toward a
specific end. This is also where the first intimation of future failure also occurs. The
Japanese had been growing and expanding and since the turn of the century they had
possessed a very definite long term goal. In the case of Malaya they spent the better part
of ten years building their networks before ramping up their effort in the final year before
the shooting war began. Once the conflict started though and they did not achieve the fast
victory they had planned for, they failed to adapt their intelligence to a short-term fluid
situation.
As the war progressed, there was also a measurable deterioration in the utilization
of intelligence as illustrated in the short example of the Battle of Taiwan-Okinawa and
the faulty assessment of USN carrier losses. By the end of the war the intelligence
bureaus’ functionality was absent from all strategic and tactical decisions. The
operational bureaus and the leadership had taken to using their own amateurish
assessments leading to dismal military operations. There are many reasons for why this
happened, in fighting and competition between the services and their branches, the failure
to decipher codes, counterintelligence issues, and the failure to share intelligence both
within and between the IJN and the IJA. The IJA and IJN triumphed early in the war due
to the efforts of their intelligence divisions. However, the degeneration of the integration
of intelligence systems into operations over the course of the conflict resulted in Japan’s
eventual defeat in the intelligence war.
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Conclusion
The Scrutable Westerners and Japanese Intelligence in WW II
The current view of Japanese intelligence operations during the Second World
War in particular, even among Japanese historians, is that the Japanese were inferior to
the West in almost all respects. This inferiority is believed to have played no small part in
their eventual defeat. SIGINT is often used as the best example of how far behind the
Allies the Japanese were. The problem with this view, and the SIGINT example in
particular, is that the conclusions drawn are based almost solely on information from the
Allied nations’ archives, American accounts in particular. It is apparent that those who
analyzed this information became the victims of the biases belonging to those who
collected and recorded the data as well as their own personal beliefs. As a result they,
almost wholly, have concluded that Japanese intelligence was lacking in both the ability
and in the seemingly vast resources that the Americans had available to them. Yet it was
not just a few years before that the exact opposite was believed true.
In the years following World War II and on through the early 1980s historians had
become accustomed to the image of the omnipresent Japanese spy. Whether they were
the businessman, the tourist, or the local doctor, they were always there waiting,
watching, and reporting. This was an image that was perhaps first conceived when
Russian authors talked about the discovery of a Japanese agent in the heart of Moscow
who had assumed the identity of a Russian officer. Yet it was made concrete at the onset
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of the Second World War by British Major-General Smyth who reported that the
Japanese had infiltrated every level of the local population so that none of his movements
went unreported. The exploits of individuals like Yoshikawa Takeo, mentioned at the
start of this work, did not detract from this myth in any way.
The reality, as in most cases, lies somewhere in between these two points of view.
Currently it remains undiscovered by historians. In truth, many of the resources that
America and the Allies had available to them were also available to the Japanese. In
several cases, such as the Battle of Malaya and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
foundations of military success were extremely effective intelligence operations. Yet, at
the same time, Japan also failed to exploit some of the advantages that it had. The result
was that it suffered because of those failures. The Japanese were not alone in their
mistakes, the Allies shared many of the same failings. Japan suffered not only from a lack
of a central intelligence authority but also from inter-agency and inter-service
competition. These issues also plagued the Americans and the rest of the Allies. As has
already been illustrated, Japan not only had learned from the European powers in the
mid-nineteenth century but had spent the seventy plus odd years leading up to the Second
World War cultivating an effective intelligence apparatus. It had been instrumental in the
decision to take on the Chinese in the First Sino-Japanese War and it had been influential
in the defeat of the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War. By the time of World War Two
it would be appurtenant to Eastern and Western countries.
Presently, the commanding thesis about Japanese Intelligence capability in both
Japanese and Western narratives, both military and intelligence, has focused on SIGINT.
This is primarily a result of the revelation of ULTRA in 1974. Due to the plethora of
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information about the breaking of Japanese codes it has been admittedly difficult, even
for Japanese academics, not to attribute American success to the achievements of this
program. The continued disclosure of information about ULTRA and its achievements
has only served to further negatively impact the evaluation of Japanese achievements in
this field. Nor has it helped to understand the role that SIGINT played in Japanese
planning. The extensive burn campaign Japanese military forces launched in 1945 have
complicated the issue. The chief Japanese signals intelligence unit, Owada Tsushin-Tai,
destroyed all of its records. Additionally, many of the unit’s agents went into hiding for
fear of reprisal for their activities. They wanted to avoid interrogation by the US
occupation forces. The only information currently available on Japanese SIGINT is based
primarily on oral histories that carry their own set of issues to deal with, difficulties like
the fact that Japanese codebreakers were keenly aware of their position at the end of the
war. As a result, they feared retaliation amongst other potential punishments and had no
issues telling those who conducted their debriefings half-truths and outright lies.166
The case of Seizo Arisue (1895-1992) provides a closing example of why
Japanese intelligence operations in the Second World War must be re-evaluated. Seizo
surrendered with many other Japanese officers to MacArthur during the occupation in
Japan in 1945. Within a year he was debriefed and it is as a result of that interrogation
that historian David Kahn argued in his chapter “Codebreaking in World Wars I and II”
in The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth
Century that Japan along with two other major belligerents could be eliminated from the

166

Edward J. Drea, “Reading Each Other’s Mail,” 185.

136

discussion on SIGINT.167 Seizo according to the records cited by Kahn had claimed that
the Japanese had failed to break American cryptosystems.168 However, documents
released by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2005 under the Nazi War Crimes
Disclosure Act reveal Seizo to be an individual who possessed both a clever and cunning
nature. Early on in the documents, Seizo was characterized as untrustworthy and
duplicitous. The author of one section of the documents suspects Seizo of delivering
intelligence to the Soviets via a courier he describes as “a cute little number who may
also be his [Seizo] mistress.”169 Furthermore, in notes entered in March of 1951 Seizo
was characterized as an power hungry individual utilizing his relations with the American
occupation forces in order to “… salvage personal power which he knows will crumble
rapidly as soon as the Americans are no longer under control.”170
Admittedly, this information came to light twenty-five years after Kahn originally
wrote his article, but it illustrates the pitfalls of relying on the interrogation records and
oral histories of Japanese intelligence officers and assuming they were giving full
disclosure. What successes may the Japanese have had in SIGINT that were protected by
individuals like Seizo? It is also an excellent example of why the subject of Japanese
intelligence operations needs revisited and revised. Kahn’s work Codebreakers: The
Story of Secret Writing published in 1967 is still regarded by many as the definitive
history of cryptography. Yet in the chapter on Japanese efforts in cryptology he spends
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the majority of his time lauding the hard work and genius of Joe Rochefort and American
cryptographic ingenuity while simultaneously denigrating the Japanese efforts. Kahn
describes Japanese successes as happening only “in extraordinarily favorable
circumstances” in the pre-war years and proceeds to elaborate on how they were
“unequal to the task” throughout the rest of the section.171 The bias of the history is
evident in the chapter title alone, “The Scrutable Orientals,” and as with his later chapter
in The Missing Dimension he again leans heavily on the post war Seizo concessions, “We
couldn’t break your codes at all.”172 While other aspects of the work may still hold up its
analysis of more recent events, particularly those involving the Japanese before and
during the Second World War, must now be called into question, as the current accepted
narrative must also be. Furthermore, this example also demonstrates how the singular
focus on SIGINT as the primary benchmark for measuring the success level of an
organization’s intelligence efforts fails to acknowledge other vital areas of intelligence
gathering. While much, if not all, of the information on Japanese signals work has been
lost there is considerable information available on their other efforts and on the successes
that they had in those fields. These other vital areas should be examined more closely and
then be used to re-evaluate Japanese intelligence efforts during World War II.
This thesis has been only a rudimentary and precursory attempt at re-evaluating
Japanese Intelligence operations during the Second World War. It is clear from the
history briefly touched on as the foundation of this effort that the implications of
Japanese intelligence organizations’ actions are not only voluminous but also have had
much greater impact than they given credit for. This is especially true when looking at
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World War II. As has been seen a reasonable or adequate history could, arguably in some
case has, been written from Allied sources but the result is one that is both full of gaps
and skewed in favor of America and its allies. It is possible, though, to write a history
derived from the careful study of the information contained in archives, oral histories,
and interrogations. Historians must then take this data and construct a framework from
which the unknown and the lost can be postulated and as a result create a more accurate
and dynamic image of Japanese intelligence accomplishments and effectiveness. The
information exists. New data is appearing every year as with the example of the
documents on Arisue Seizo. Some already exists in an astonishingly unabridged form like
that on the Nakano School. Yet other information is patchy at best if not lost almost
entirely such as that related to IJA signals intelligence during the Pacific War. Never the
less, there are enough pieces of the puzzle presently, with more being found every year,
for us to begin to build a more balanced and clear picture of Japanese intelligence during
the Second World War.

139

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aldrich, Richard. Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britian, America and the
Politics of Secret Service. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Allen, Louis. Japan: The Years of Triumph From Feudal Isolation to Pacific empire.
New York: American Heritage Press, 1971.
Allen, Louis. "Japanese Intelligence Systems." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no.
4 (October 1987): 547-562.
—. Singapore 1941-1942. London: Frank Cass and Co. LTD., 1977.
Andrew, Christopher. "Codebreakers and Foreign Offices: The French, British and
American Experience." In The Missing Dimension: Governents and Intelligence
Communities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Christopher Andrew, & David
Dilks, 33-53. London: MacMillan, 1984.
Andrew, Christopher. "Secret Intelligence and British Foreign Policy 1900-1939." In
Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, edited by Christopher
Andrew, & Jeremy Noakes, 9-28. Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987.
"Arisue, Seizo." CIA FOIA Reading Room. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. n.d.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/519cd820993294098d516c4b
(accessed January 22, 2018).
Beasley, W.G., ed. Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy 1853-1868. London:
Oxford University Press, 1960.
Bennett, J.W., W.A. Hobart, and J.B. Spitzer. Intelligence and the Cryptanalytic
Activities of the Japanese during World War II. Aegean Park Press, 1986.
Blackburn, Kevin. "Reminiscence and War Trauma: Recalling the Japanese Occupation
of Singapore, 1942-1945." Oral History (Oral History Society) 33, no. 2 (Autumn
2005): 91-98.
Bridges, Brian. "Britain and Japanese Espionage in Pre-War Malaya: The Shinozaki
Case." Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 1 (January 1986): 23-35.

140

Burtness, Paul S., and Warren U. Ober. "Research Methodology: Problem of Pearl
Harbor Intelligence Reports." Military Affairs (Soceity for Military History) 25,
no. 3 (Autumn 1961): 132-146.
Carlson, Elliot. Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted
Yamamoto at Midway. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011.Chapman, J.W.M.
"Japanese Inteligence 1919-1945: A Suitable Case for Treatment." In Intelligence
and International Relations 1900-1945, edited by Christopher Andrew, & Jeremy
Noakes, 145-190. Exeter: University of Exeter, 1987.
Chapman, John W.M. "A Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the 'Anti-Comintern'." Journal
of Contemporary History 22, no. 2 (April 1987): 333-372.
Coox, Alvin. "Japanese Net Assessment in the Era before Pearl Harbor." In Calculations:
Net Assessment and the Coming of World War II, edited by Williamson Murray,
& Allan R. Millett, 258-298. New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992.
Donovan, Peter, and John Mack. Code Breaking in the Pacific. New York: Springer,
2014.
Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Conflict of Duty: U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983.
Drea, Edward. MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992.
Drea, Edward. "Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence ad the Soviet Invasion of
Manchuria, 1945." Military Affairs (Society for Military History) 48, no. 2 (April
1984): 66-73.
Drea, Edward. "Reading Each Others Mail: Japanese Communication Intelligence, 19201945." The Journal for Military History 55, no. 2 (April 1991): 185-206.
Duus, Peter. The Rise of Modern Japan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
Elphick, Peter. Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-1945.
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997.
—. Singapore: The Pregnable Fortress, A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion.
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995.
141

Elphick, Peter, and Michael Smith. Odd Man Out: The Story of the Singapore Traitor.
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993.
Everest-Phillips, Max. "The Pre-War Fear of Japanese Espionage: Its Impact and
Legacy." Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (April 2007): 243-265.
Fält, Olavi. "Collaboration between Japanese Intelligence and the Finnish underground
during the Russo-Japanese war." Asian Profile 4, no. 2 (1976).
Ford, Douglas. The Elusive Enemy: U.S. Naval Intelligence and the Imperial Japanese
Fleet. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011.
Fujiwara, Iwaichi. F. Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in Southeast Asia
during World War II. Translated by Yoji Akashi. Hong Kong: Heinemann
Educational Books Limited, 1983.
Glass, Robert Rigby, and Phillip B. Davidson. Intelligence is for Commanders.
Harrisburg: Military Service Pub. Co, 1948.
Hackett, Roger F. Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922.
Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Hart, B.H. Liddell. History of the Second World War. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1970.
Hastings, Max. The Secret War. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2016.
Holmes, W.J. Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific
during World War II. Annapolis: Blue Jacket Books Naval Institute Press, 1979.
Hore, Peter. The World Encyclopedia of Battleships. London: Hermes House, 2005.
Iwashima, Hisao. Johosen ni Kanpai Shita (Japan's Total Defeat in the Intelligence War).
Tokyo: Hara Shouhou, 1984.
—. "Problems in Japan's Defense." Orientation Seminars on Japan No.9. Japan: Japan
Foundation, Office for the Japanese Studies Center, 1982.
Kahn, David. "Codebreaking in World Wars I and II: The Major Successes and Failures,
Their Causes and Their Effects." The Historical Journal (Cambridge University
Press) 23, no. 3 (September 1980): 617-639.
142

—. The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing. New York: The MacMillan Company,
1967.
Kahn, David. "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5
(Winter 1991): 138-152.
Kotani, Ken. Japanese Intelligence in World War II. Translated by Chiharu Kotani.
Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009.
Kotani, Ken. "Japanese Intelligence in WWII: Successes and Failures." NIDS Security
Reports, 2009: 1-27.
Kratoska, Paul. The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998.
Leng, Yuen Choy. "The Japanese Community in Malaya before the Pacific War: Its
Genesis and Growth." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (September
1978): 163-179.
Matthews, Tony. Shadows Dancing: Japanese Espionage against the West, 1939-1945.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
McClain, James L. A Modern History of Japan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2002.
Muir, Jr., Malcolm. "Rearming in a Vacuum: United Sates Navy Intelligence and the
Japanese Capital Ship Threat, 1936-1945." The Journal of Military History
(Society for Military History) 54, no. 4 (October 1990): 473-485.
Nakamuda, Kenishi. Joho Shikan no Kaiso. Tokyo: Sonorama, 1985.
Nish, Ian. "Japanese Intelligence 1894-1922." In Intelligence and International Relations
1900-1945, edited by Christopher Andrew, & Jeremy Noakes, 127-144. Exeter:
University of Exeter, 1987.
Nish, Ian. "Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo-Japanese War." In The
Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth
Century, edited by Christopher Andrew, & David Dilks, 17-32. London:
Macmillan Publishers LTD, 1984.

143

Onraet, René. Singapore-A Police Background. London: Dorothy Crisp and Co., 1947.
Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and
the Japanese Navy in World War II. New York: Random House, 1995.
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. London,
New York: Allen Lane, 2009.
Rohwer, Jurgen. "Signal Intelligence in World War II: The Unfolding Story." The
Journal of Military History 63, no. 4 (October 1999): 939-951.
Seth, Michael J. A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present. Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2010.
Soustelle, Jasques. Daily Life of the Aztecs. New York: Dover Publications, 2011.
Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York:
The Free Press, 2000.
Stone, Corin. U.S. National Inteligence: An Overview 2013. Washington D.C.: Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, 2013.
Tipton, Elise K. The Japanese Police State: The Tokko in Interwar Japan. Honolulu,
Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.
Tsuji, Masanobu, Howe, H.V. Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Worst Defeat.
Translated by Margaret E. Lake. Cambridge: De Capo Press, 1997.
—. Singapore 1941-1942: The Japanese Version of the Malayan Campaign of World
War II. Translated by Margaret E. Lake. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961.
Wukovits, John. World War II in Asia and the Pacific. Vol. 1, in A Companion to
American Military History: War, The Armed Forces, edited by James C. Bradford,
194-221. Chichester, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010.
Young, Katsu H. "The Nomonhan Incident: Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union."
Monumenta Nipponica (Sophia University) 22, no. 1/2 (1967): 82-102.

144

